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Hugh Shearer, President of the ACP Council
Introduction Cards
Relations between EuroPe and the
countries of the South already have
a history, but it is one that cannot
readily be understood unless we
consider  a few fundamental econ-
omic realities that underlie and
explain the interdePendence be-
tween Europe and the Third World.
So let us put our cards on the table,
and take a look at the substantial
mutal interests at stake. They explain
the past, and shape the future too.
It is because there are mutual
interests that a EuroPe-South
cooperation policy was possible in
the first place and that it must now
develop. Recognizing this is not a
sign of political egoism or narrow-
minded materialism. Although our
interests leave us no choice but to
cooperate, there is still room fo,
palitics, morals and humanism, fo,
they alone can inspire oar priorities 
-
and the way in which we coo7erate.l
on thc tablcI  CARDSONTHETABLE
Crisis? Long live the Third World! That is
how the very serious OECD experts  think -
aloud -for they believe that'since I973,the
developing countries have been a dynamic
outlet for exports from the industrialized
countries'. Yet the public in Europe,
stricken by the crisis, can only see the Third
World as an unfair competitor and a bot*
tomless financial pit. Well, the public  is
wrong!
Europe's present economic  and social slump
would already have turned to disaster' no
doubt, without our customers  in the South.
Think about it! Our trade with the Third
World guarantees jobs for 5 million people
in the Community.  The South, our biggest
trading partner, absorbs  41"/" of the sales we
make outside the Communlty  -twice as
much as Japan and the USA combined (see
Figure 1). We do not just export anything
either. Nearly 80% of our sales to the Third
World are finished products, those that
bring in the most because of their high
added-value.
Over the past decade, the markets of the
South have become  increasingly important
outlets for our goods. An independent
expert report suggests that European ex-
ports to the Third World increased  twice as
fast as those to the industrialized  countries
between 1973 and 1977. And the trend is
continuing,  in spite of the sudden brake
recently applied to world trade, because
sales to the Third World, unlike our extra-
Community  trade as a whole, continued to
expand into 1982.
To whom do we sell? First of all to the oil-
exporting countries, whose purchasing
power has grown spectacularly since 1973.
And then to the countries of the ACP Group
(ttre O+ nations  of Africa, the Caribbean and
the Pacific, which are linked to the Commu-
nity by the Lom6 Convention)  and the
countries  south of the Mediterranean'  which
Our qstomers
JAPAN
1. Where do our exports go? - 1982
U55R
DEVELOPINq
CciUNTRIES
Source: Eurostat. (in %)
U5A
Unless societies prepare their citizens fo, the interdependent world they have
inherited . . .in the South
CARDSONTHETABLE I
account  for a third of sales to the South (see
Figure 2).
So, not only do we sell a lot, we also sell
profitably. The Third World, our biggest
customer as far as agricultural  products are
concerned, buys finished products above all
- machinery and transport  equipment
(43 5%), manufactu  res (26.5"/")  and
chemicals  (9%),with  the OPEC countries
taking half and the ACP countries a third.
So not far short of half our exports of fin-
ished products go to the Third World - a
field in which our trade balance  is progress-
ing rapidly (see Figure 3). These are all
benefits which make the so-called invasion
of our markets by products from the coun-
tries of the South  seem verv relatiVe.
We can see then that the Third World looms
large in our economy. Its sustained  demand
since the crisis began has helped  us maintain
employment  and activity  in the Community.
But the crisis is not over and, in 1982,for  the
first time since the war, the volume of world
trade dropped. Trade between Europe  and
the South was not spared - the increase in
1982 was only 2"/" and it had been 2lo/" the
previousyear....Why?
Because of falling commodity  prices, pro-
tectionism  in the North and bigger debts in
the South. The Third World was unable to
increase its exports or borrow more and had
to cut imports to service its debt. The EEC
Commission was concerned and sounded
the alarm: 'The impoverishment  of the
Third World is having repercussions  on the
Community markets.' For F,urope  must
realize that if it wants to go on selling to the
South, the South has to have money to buy
from us. So, one answer is to open up our
markets to it . . I
2. Our exports to the South - L982
(1) ALCTERIA,  HoRoCCO |rl.tp TUNIS\A.
(2) EGVVr, svRlA/ L66AN0N  AND IoRDAN.
1:; r X Uo X6Sn/ SlNqA POfl Ei l'lAlJYslA/  PHILIPP lN E5
AND THAII,J\ND.
CHINA AsEAN
(3)
gl
G
trl
F
X
UJ
/ o
COUNTRIES  1OO
LATIN
AT4ERKA (1)MAGHREB
(OI4ASHREK
Source:  Eurostat. (in %)
INDIA
ALL DEVELOPIN0T
3. Our trade in manufactures
1977-82
with the South
(in I 000 million ECU)
. . . their governments wilt find it dfficult to take the decisions that an interdepen-
dent world economv demands.
Brandt CommissioriI  CARDSONTHETABLE
S1ho buys
What is the point of development?  For the
poor nations, it is obvious - to give them a
happier life. But why should the rich nations
help the unfavoured  nations to develop?
There is the unbearable sight of injustice,
poverty and hunger, of course. But has
human solidarity  ever been a driving force in
history?,Perhaps  it would be better to talk
about our interests . . .
Europe is looking for new consumers,  but
the needs of the Community  market are
nowhere near the levels of the 'glorious  30
years'of the post-war era. Any hope for
further growth today is to be found  across
the seas, with the peoples of the South. They
are still on the fringe of our consumer  society
and their aspirations to well-being  seem to
know no bounds. But a good consumer
needs purchasing  power and the Third
World is penniless.  Hard luck, perhaps? But
it is hard luck on us too! Increasing devel-
opment aid and finding an answer to the
debt problem would already  be a step in the
right direction.  But the South earns 84% of
its income from its exports. If we are to help
our own growth, wb must encourage  econ-
omic development in the countries of the
South, for when it has mo.ney,  the Third
World buys our goods.
Here is an example (see the figures) - four
nations which have developed in distinctly
different ways over the past 20 years. But
they have one important thing in common -
the more they have sold, the more they have
bought. That is what interests  us!
South Korea is one of the newly industrial-
ized countries.  Europe and the industrialized
world  as a whole find its dynamic economy
frightening,  yet, in 7965, its export trade
was Smaller than that of either the Ivory
South Korea
1965 19
1o ooo
LSw
2ooo
lSooo
\o o@
5o@
c@
lSoo
lo00
5oo
o
Source: Unctad.
Exports
- 
Imports (in million USD)
L6 o2g
20 296 ?r bo
lu s52
UP'4
,/ ,ny ,/
,1 ,/ v
829
4
Ivory Coast
to  '15
5ooo
25oo
2oo
t6o
l0oo
5@
o
Source: Unctad.
Exports
- 
Imports (in million USD)
Will it be possible to go back to minimum growth if the Third World markets
do not expand rapidly?
Claude Chevssonfrom us?
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Coast or Zambia and today, the external
trade of neither of these two countries would
bear comparison!  Manufactures  make up
80% of South Korea's exports and food
products, minerals and metals the rest.
In Africa, the lvory Coast is an example of
an economy which has expanded  regularly
and diversified  its external trade over the
past 20 years. In 1982, more than 60% of its
foreign  sales (as against 80% in 1979) were
made up of three products - coffee, cocoa
and forestry  products. The Ivory Coast also
exports other agricultural  products (pine-
apples, bananas, palm oil, rubber, cola nuts
and cotton fibre) and even oil products ai
well. The country's  main imports  are oil,
machinery and mechanical appliances,  road
vehicles,  iron and steel products and cereals.
But in Africa, the Ivory Coast is a rather
unusual case. Most African countries
depend on just one or perhaps  two export
products -which means  they also depend on
world prices, which can be very unreliable.
Zambia, for example,  counts on copper sales
for more than 90% of its needs. When the
price of copper goes up, the country's pur-
chasing power goes up with it. But today,
after several years of depression  in the
copper sector, Zambia has had to call on the
IMF. Yet this is a country with more natural
assets (agricultural  and other) than the Ivory
Coast . . .
Niger is 80% dependent on sales of its
uranium  for its export earnings  and its pur-
chasing power has expanded  rapidly thanks
to this metal. Llke Zambia, Niger sees the
volume of its imports wax or wane with the
rise and fall of the price of its raw material.
One more reason for the EEC to back
commodity  price stabilization  projects. I
Zambia
15oo
t250
l0oo
15o
5@
2So
o
Source:  Unctad.
- 
Exports
- 
Imports (in ntillion LISD)
Niger
Source: Unctad.
- 
Exports
Imports (irt ntillion USD)
The economic recovery) of the
lack of raw materials.
West could well peter out for lack of customers . . . or
Edgard PisaniI  CARDSONTHETABLE
What do you drink at breakfast time?
Coffee or tea or maybe hot chocolate?
Now, just for a moment imagine that they
were not available any more . . .270 million
Europeans  would be off to a very bad start
every day! Is this unthinkable?  Probably,
but not as unthinkable  as you think, for the
Community  depends on the countries of the
Third World for almost  100% of its supplies
of these three products.
And it is not just morning coffee either. It is
the whole of the economic life of the EEC,
as our daily consumption of each of these
products  keeps transport companies on their
feet, and factories and supermarkets and
thousands of families and workers of all
levels, all of them European.  But coffee and
cocoa and tea are only three striking exam-
ples from a list of dozens of commodities  . . .
In 1982, close to 85% of the Community's
imported  commodities came from the
South. This general  figure has to be
weighted differently in each category of
products  (sec Figure I ), but it docs rcvcal an
undeniable fact - that we are massively
dependent  on the Third World for tlur econ-
omic wellbeing. Far more than either the
USA or the Soviet Union.
As every citizen of Europe  knows since the
oil crisis in 1973, Europe depends on the
developing countries for its energy (oil,
natural  gas and uranium).  Oil and petroleum
products make up three quarters of our
energy supplies and 9 out ofevery  10 tonnes
of oil come from the South, principally the
Middle East and Africa. We import 95"/" of
our uranium from the ACP countries. This
is long-term  dependence  too, as the Euro-
pean Community  only has 2-3% of the
world's oil and uranium  reserves.
What the same European citizen probably
does not know is that we are even more
ALL TRINARY  PKOD$CTS
OTHER AGRICULTUML  PBODUCIS
FUELs
100 100
811
Thewealth
FOODSTOFFS
H1NEBAL  ORE5
NON. FERROUS NETALg
4B
1. The commodities we buv -1982
Sourc'e: GATT (e.rtra EEC irnports :  100; .from developing countries in "/u)
Raw material supplies will never be reliable until the developing
guaranteed fair and stable prices.
countrrcs are
Brandt Commissionof the South
CARDSONTHETABLE I
heavily dependent for many of the agricul-
tural raw materials - rubber, cotton, sisal,
jute, tropical  wood and certain vegetable
oils - which our industries need. The Euro-
pean Community  produces  none of these.
And let us not forget the food products,
such as sugar, bananas and spices,  which are
part of our everyday life (see Figure 2).
In the more strategic field of mineral prod-
ucts, we are more than 50% dependent on
our imports. Production  in the Member
States and recycling enable us to cover half
our lead and aluminium  requirements, but
for all the other products, the share of
European production is dramatically  small.
Two thirds of extra-Community imports
come from the South (see Figure 3), prin-
cipally the least-developed countries
(LDCs). Our ACP partners are important
suppliers of aluminium,  copper, iron ore,
manganese, nickel, cobalt, fluor and phos-
phates to the EEC.
So nature has not spoiled the European
Community,  which will always depend  on
the formidable mineral resouces of the
South (see Figure 3). Africa, especially well-
endowed, possesses reserves of primary
products which are largely intact - and even
uncharted. For there is not as much pro-
spection in Africa  as there should be - only
USD 50 million of the USD 1 500 million
invested in international mineral prospec-
tion each year. Firms in the EEC have only
channelled 2"/" of their investments  to
Africa,  as against 80% to the
industrialized  countries. Yet it is clear
that a bridge must be built beween
Africa and a Europe starved  of raw ma-
terials. But if it is to become  a regular,
reliable  source of supplies  to the EEC,
Africa needs a massive injection  of funds to
prospect for resources and modernize its
mining industries. I
2. Our dependence
for some products - L982
90-100 Coffee, cocoa beans, manioc, bananas, natural rubber, uranium,  sugar
palm oil, coconut oil, sisal, oil
80-90  Tea, groundnut  oil, tin
70-80  Spices, natural phosphates,  copper
60-70  Oil-cake,  aluminium
50-60  Iron, tobacco, manganese
40-50  Zinc, cotton, lead, petroleum  products
30-40 Groundnuts,  tungsten
20-30  Rice
Source: Eurostat  Siena. (in "/" of extra-Community  imports)
3. The Southts mineral reserYes
Source: EEC. (in "/" of world reserves)
IAfrica
It is vitally important for the Community to guarantee and diversify its supplies of
raw materials.
EEC CommissionI  CARDSONTHETABLE
The European Community  is the Third
World's  biggest export market  (see Figure  1).
If South-South trade is discounted the
EEC absorbs a third of the exports of the
developing countries. Although the Com-
munity market is irreplaceable, it has still
declined in importance,  as its share of the
South's global  exports  dropped from 337o to
24"h between 1970 and 1982, to the benefit
of trade between countries of the Third
World.
Europe's importance  becomes clearer if we
look at the breakdown of the South's exports
by region (Figure 2) and by product
(Figure 3).
It is important to emphasize just how de-
cisive our market is for Black Africa and the
Maghreb, two regions  from which we buy
half the exports. The countries south of the
Mediterranean  export three quarters of
their agricultural  products (citrus fruit, veg-
etables, wine and olive oil) to the EEC. The
ACP countries find nearly 40"/" of their
export outlets in Europe. But although the
EEC is the biggest market as far as Africa  is
concerned,  the USA is far more important to
the Caribbean. The EEC and Japan rank
equal as markets  for the Pacific, but sales by
the countries of this region to industrialized
nations  other than the USA and Japan are
twice what they are to the EuroPean
Community.
As far as products are concerned,  commodi-
ties (fuel, food and raw materials) make
up 80% of what the Third World sells us, a
percentage  that has not altered since 1970!
These commodities rarely represent more
than 10% of the value of the finished prod-
uct, so by exporting  its natural wealth
without processing it, the Third World is
getting a bad bargain . . .
Finished  products only account  for 20"/" of
our purchases in the South. Yet the coun-
The South's
1. Total exports
from the South -1982
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In I 97 6, we had to sell 4 tonnes of cocoa to buy a tractor. In I 982, it was 7 .6 tonnes.
Hugh Shearer
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tries of Latin America and South-East Asia
which supply them to us look like a threat to
a Europe that is up against deep-reaching
industrial reorganization.  We imported
22 000 million ECU-worth of manufactures
from the Third World in 1982 and 10 000
million ECU-worth  of them came from four
'newly industrialized  countries' - Hong
Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Brazil, the
ACP and OPEC playing only minor parts in
comparison.
What are the facts of this invasion  of finished
products that gets such a bad press in
Europe? What we are actually talking about
is a small group of products (textiles and
clothing,  leather goods and footwear)  for
which the EEC had a trade deficit with the
Third World of 4 500 million ECU in 1982.
In isolation,  the amount cannot fail to
impress us. Yet what we must realize  is that,
in the same year, our trade in electronic
equipment with the South brought us in a
surplus  of more than 5 000 million ECU.
And it is worth pointing  out that in 1982,
we made a surplus  of 60 000 million ECU
in our total trade in finished products
with the developing countrics.
However, there is no denying  that our textile
and clothing industry  is in a very bad way,
with a 4 000 million ECU trade deficit with
the Third World. Would penalizing the
newly industrialized  countries be the
answer? Perhaps not, as it would be forget-
ting that the battle  has to be fought, within
the Community  first and then between  the
EEC, the USA and Japan. Competitionwith
the new producer countries only comes
later. If this Community industry has lost
700 000 jobs since 1973, it is primarily be-
cause of higher productivity, not imports.
And, in 1982, we sold the South machinery
for its textile and clothing industries, to the
tune of 730 million ECU. I
2. Exports from the by region - L982
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3. Exports from the South,
by product - 1980
World USA Japan USSR
Foodstuffs 100 17 7 10
Agricultural products 100 I
r1 7 19
a
J
Mineral ores
and fertilizers roo 'u*ffi 
13 27 2
Fuels  1oo 
- iJ- *  22  n  0.2
Chemicals
Source:  Unctad. (in %)
The North cannot hope to export more until it ensures that the South gets better
access to its markets.
Brandt Commission
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One dollar down, nine back! A blunt little
phrase perhaps, but one that shows just what
this aid to the Third World, which we
readily imagine to be so generous,  is worth.
Compare the figures for aid with those for
our sales: for every dollar we give the South,
we sell it USD 9-worth  of goods -and this is
without our aid always being tied to an ob-
ligation to buy European. Moralists,  of
course, will be shocked  by such self-inter-
ested generosity, but . . .
. . . where Europe gets 9 times its original
outlay, the USA gets 15, Japan 21 and the
Soviet Union 25. So there is no need for the
Community  to blush, bearing in mind the
fierce economic  battle going on inter-
nationally.  And the countries of the South
are well aware that they get the most official
development aid from the EEC, twice the
American  figure, four times the Japanese
figure and six times the figure for the
Eastern Bloc (see Figure 1). Europe's  share
is even bigger if all the finance (loans and
grants)  that flows into the Third World is
taken into account (see Figure 2).
But the comparative advantages of the Euro-
pean attitude do not stop there. Although
the EEC has not yet reached the UN target
of 0.7% of GNP in aid to the South, it does
far better (0.53%) than the USA (O.24%),
Japan (0.29%) or the Eastern Bloc (0.13).
However it should follow the example of
Norway and Sweden (0.92%).
About II'/" ofEuropean aid is channelled
through the Community  and the rest is dealt
with by the Member  States, which allocate
it as part of their bilateral  relations and make
contributions  to international  organizations.
Three quarters of Community  aid goes into
financial and technical cooperation  and a
quarter into food aid. Let us complete the
picture by saying that development  aid rep-
resents 7 .4% of Community  spending,  the
second item in the budget after agriculture.
Aid an
1. Official lgy"I^opment aid
1981-82
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Nobody in the Third World gets as much as two thousandths of the average income
of a taxpayer in the developed countries. Is that a lot? Is it too much?
Edgard Pisani
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2. Financial flows to the South - L982
Total world contribution
Total CommunitY contribution
93
37.7 (40%)
13.5
r.3
2.3
20.6
of which: official grants
private-sector  grants
official loans
private-sector  loans
Source:  OECD. (in USD I 000 million)
Geographically  speaking, Community  aid
proper  goes primarily to Africa (65%)' But
if bilateral aid is counted, Europe of the Ten
is the biggest donor everywhere. It provides
50% of all aid to Africa, 57 5% of all aid to
Central  and South America and 25"/" of all
aid to Asia.
The biggest European  donors of official aid
are France (including its overseas depart-
ments and territories), followed by the FR of
Germany and the United Kingdom.  The
nations  giving the largest percentage of GNP
the Netherlands  (1.08%), Denmark
(0.75%) and France (0.73%).
Nevertheless, official development  aid only
accounts  for 6"/" of the total resources of the
South - which is mainly financed (8a%) by
its export earnings.  The rest comes from
loans on standard market terms. This shows
once more how much the development of
the countries of the South depends on the
stable growth of commodity  prices  and on
the industrialization and diversification  of
their economies.
But here again, the differences between the
various regions  of the Third World must be
taken into account. Although official aid
only makes up 1.5% of the total income of
the OPEC countries, the figure is 45% for
the least developed countries, most of which
are in Africa, the continent  that relies most
on official aid. The World Bank suggests
that the present  level of aid to Africa (almost
USD 5 000 million) will have to be doubled
by 1990 if it is to have a chance of emerging
from its under-development.  This is not a
huge demand to make of the international
community.  If, for example,  everyone  was as
generous  as the European  Community  (see
Figure 3), Africa would have its extra USD
5 000 million and there would be almost
another USD 15 000 million left over to
cover other problems in the South. I
3. If
the
everyone gave as much as
EEC - 0.53% of GNP -
Today
t2.4
7.0
3.r
27.0
8.1
2.r
37 .4
Tomorrow
EEC
USA
Japan
OECD (total)
OPEC
Eastern Bloc
World total
12.4
t5.4
5.6
39.r
8.2
8.7
56.0
Source:  F.EC. (in USD I 000 million)
Interdependence  must be the only basis on which we build our cooperation
Hugh Shearer
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I4Z HistoryIntroduction
A look at a few basic facts reveals the
economic ties that bind EuroPe and
the Third World together. Without
this knowledge,how  can we under-
stand the history of the Commu-
nity's development policY or more
important, prepare its future?
But there is another as7ect to take
into account, besides economic
realities. The Third World expects
more of Europe than iust trade or
financial arrangements  and Europe
cannot confine itself to safeguarding
its markets and its sources of supply-
Our mutual interest is economic, no
doubt, but it is political too. To
varying degrees, EuroPe and the
Third World have been relegated to
the sidelines by the suPer-Powers,
without being safe from any tension,
or conflict between them. BY cooq'
erating, Europe and the Third
World can graduallY strengthen
their independence and help create
poles of stability in the world.
Here, the Lom6 Convention model
for cooperation  is an inestimable
achiev ement. H ow ev er, the pro gress
made with international relations
between l'{orth and South has still
to'be translated into tangible results
in development terms. The Euro-
pean Community has devised a
sound model for cooPeration and,
with its partners, it is now trying to
define a modus operandi for more
effectiv e dev elopment. f
Europe-South
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The end of the colonies
At the Messina Conference of 1955,
when the foundations of the future
European Economic CommunitY were
negotiated, the problems of 'overseas'
were not even mentioned. Three years
later, when the TreatY of Rome was
signed, France managed to get its
reluctant partners to agree to establish
a connection between  the newlY
emergent  Europe and the overseas
countries - mainly colonies  and terri-
tories under French sovereignty, but
some recently independent countries,
such as Morocco and Tunisia, as well.
Although the Treaty proclaims solida-
rity between Europe and the overseas
countries and asserts the need to further
their prosperity, any search in the
Community's'constitution'  for a defi-
nition of a proper cooperation  and
development policy would be in vain.
The time was not yet ripe. The process
of decolonization,  although well under
w?y, was by no means comPlete.  All
that had happened  was that, when the
Six negotiated a global compromise,
France got them to agree that its entry
into the common market would not
compromise any privileged  economic
relations or free trade arrangements it
had with its partners overseas. It also
got Europe to help set them uP bY
creating the first European Develop-
ment Fund (EDF), with a sum of 581
million units of account (1 u. a. :  USD
1 in 1959) for a five-year period.
So emergent Europe was committed
both commercially  and financially to
about 20 overseas countries. The fact
that the end of the colonial period
coincided with the beginnings of Euro-
pean integration  was to give rise to
some surprising developments. Euro-
pean cooperation  policy, the result of
both chance and necessity, was grad-
ually to take shape. It was a policy that
the authors of the Treaty of Rome never
imagined.  :w
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Lomt - a policy the authors of the Treaty of Rome never dreamed of.Yaounde, testing gound for the futtne
At the end of the 1950s, history put
on a burst of speed, as it sometimes
seems to do. Africa was in the throes of
decolonization.  The ex-French colonies
became independent nations between
1958 and 1962. In 1960, Belgium
handed over to Zaire, to Burundi and
to Rwanda. Somalia gained indepen-
dence the same year.
With the exception of Guinea, which
made a spectacular  break with France,
all these newly-independent  countries
were anxious to preserve the benefits
of their association with Europe - i.e.
privileged  access to its markets, parti-
cularly for the commodities that were
so important to the treasuries  of these
young States, and financial  aid, modest
no doubt, but not entirely negligible  at
a time when the call everywhere was
for equipment and development.
So the association  sealed by the first
Yaoundd Convention in 1963 reallv
stemmed  from the system granted uni-
laterally in 1958. But this time, the
agreement  was negotiated and the
outcome of a perfectly explicit choice
on the part of the 18 Associated States
of Africa and Madagascar  (AASM).
Yaound6 I already contained the basic
characteristics that were later to
become the Lomd policy - a freely
negotiated agreement, covering a
similar five-year period, concluded  with
a group of countries (the 18 AASM)
and dealing with both trade and finan-
cial and technical aid. Lastly, joint in-
stitutions were set up at both ministerial
and parliamentary  level.
With Yaound6I  came the second Euro-
pean Development  Fund. While the 1st
Fund gave priority to infrastructure and
equipment, the 2nd Fund put more than
40% into developing and diversifying
the productive  sector. By making a
special effort in agriculture,  European
aid was once more anticipating  future
trends.
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The Yaound6 Convention  also con-
tained innovations. It diversified  the
instruments of cooperation. The
2nd EDF provided  loans as well as'
grants, and financing was no longer
confined to investments,  but could also
cover technical assistance  and training.
And for the first time the European
Investment Bank came in alonsside  the
EDF.
Yaound6 II (1969-75) followed  the
same pattern. However,  the negotia-
tions were marked by difficult discus-
sions on access to the Community
market for products covered  by the
common  agricultural policy and, even at
this early stage, on sugar. These prod-
ucts were in fact excluded  from the
system of free trade that the association
provided,  but the Community  finally
agreed to grant them more favourable
arrangements  than those applied to
third countries.  ffi
3rd EDF (1970-7s)
The third Fund continued support for productive
investments. Aid for industrialization was increased
thanks to more flexible lending terms, and the Com-
munity could now take minority holdings in risk capi-
tal operations in AASM firms. Aid for the tourist
sector was also provided. And lastly, aid for the nrar-
keting of tropical products figured amongst the new
EDF objectives.
1st EDF 3rd EDF
EDF grants
special loans
total
EIB ordinary loans
Total
580
580
s80
810
90
900
100
1 000
The first three EDFs
lst EDF (1958-63)
The first Fund was for countries  whose economic  and
social infrastructure  was still very inadequate; its
resources  were used for basic facilities (transport  and
communications networks, hospitals, maternity
units, dispensaries, schools and wells) rather than
directly productive investments  (plantations and fac-
tories).
2nd EDF (1964-69)
The new EDF continued to finance infrastructure,
but this time placed more emphasis on the produc-
tive sector (purchase of agricultural  equipment,
technical assistance officers, etc.) and projects to di-
versify the economies of the AASM. It also financed
missions by experts who were sent out to prepare
projects or supervise their implementation, and
funded training schemes for African staff. Lastly, the
Fund financed emergency aid and advanced  money
to States in financial difficulties.
2nd EDF
Source: EEC. (in million ECU)Trc  EUROPE-SOUTH DIALOGUE
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The first agreements
withtheMaglreb
Cooperation with the countries on the
southern  shores of the Mediterranean
got under way more tentatively than
with French-speaking Black Africa, and
less systematicallY.
Algeria was still French territory and
therefore eligible for the 1st EDF. Once
independent, it was to wait some time
before establishing  cooperation  links
with the CommunitY - the wounds of
the struggle for independence  needed
time to heal. Morocco  and Tunisia,
however,  were explicitly covered by a
protocol to the Treaty of Rome in view
of their privileged economic relations
with France. Rabat and Tunis called for
the opening of negotiations on the con-
clusion of association  agreements with
the Six as early as I963,but had to wait
until 1969 for them to be signed (for a
five-year period). They were trade
agreements, as the community  did not
wish to go in for proper cooperation
asreements. A few months later, similar
agreements were signed with Malta and
Israel and negotiations with Egypt and
Lebanon were started.
Here, then, were the separate elements
that, two years later, the CommunitY
was to undertake to combine and
organize in the framework  of an 'overall
Mediterranean  approach'.
But this piecemeal  beginning, plus the
historical  and political conditions of the
region, ruled out a collective, inter-
regional approach of the kind adopted
for Black Africa.
History, geography and the close econ-
omic relations attendant on them dic-
tated the areas where Europe's future
cooperation  policy would be concen-
trated - Black Africa and the Medi-
terranean. But a PolicY in the real
meaning  of the term still had to be
formulated. t
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organized (into the Group of 77),
realized  that they needed to stick
together and defined their collective
demands. The North-South game took
a different political turn, as European
leaders were well aware. In January
1971, the European Commission  pro-
duced a memorandum. The time had
come, it said, to define a Community
development cooperation policy. The
Yaound6 policy, it added, had been the
Community's  testing ground and a
reflection of its desire to take on an
increasing  share of responsibility  to-
wards all the developing countries.
Then, in October 1972, the Heads of
State or Government of the Community
confirmed  their desire to set up a
global development cooperation policy
- without abandoning its regional
association  policy.
It was this regional cooperation that
circumstances  were to favour most.
Following the negotiations on the
United Kingdom's  entry into the
Community, Protocol No 22 invited 20
independent Commonwealth  countries
in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific
to negotiate association  agreements or
trade agreements with the Nine. A
similar invitation went out to all Afri-
can countries with comparable pro-
duction structures. In short, the whole
of independent Black Africa was
approached.
TheNine andlnme
Very early on, the Six showed a desire
not to confine themselves  to the essen-
tially French-speaking Africa of the
AASM (subsequently 19 with the
accession  of Mauritius). Back in 1963,
the Council of Ministers  adopted a
declaration  of intent as far as third
countries with economic and pro-
duction structures comparable to those
of the AASM were concerned. It
offered them a choice between acces-
sion to the Lom6 Convention,  associa-
tion srzi generis and a preferential trade
agreement.  Three East African
countries (Kenya, Tanzania and
Uganda) plus Nigeria called for nego-
tiations. An association  agreement  was
signed with Lagos in 1966, but it was
never ratified and so did not take effect.
The first Arusha Agreement (con-
cluded with the countries of East
Africa) met with the same fate, but the
second one, mainly on trade, was in-
itialled in 1969 and took effect in early
r97I.
This move towards English-speaking
Africa, although significant,  in fact
remained very limited until the enlarge-
ment of the Community itself. Only
then did Europe extend its cooperation
policy, both in Africa and the rest of
the world. But this was not an automatic
consequence.  Other factors helped
move Europe-Third World relations on
to the next stage of their development.
Soon after gaining independence, the
developing countries got themselves
1
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A date was soon fixed. Before 1 August
7973, talks with both the old Yaound6
and Arusha associates and the new
invitees were to start. In April, the
Commission presented  the Deniau
memorandum as a basis for discussion.
Its aim was to achieve a synthesis be-
tween the advantages acquired and
guaranteed  to the present partners of
the association  and genuine  renewal
of this association. which. because of its
enlargement, would mean that very
considerable  adaptation and additions
were called for.
This memorandum contained most of
the proposals  which were to make the
Lom6 Convention an advance on that of
Yaound6. The most spectacular
proposal was the one which led to
Stabex as, it said, the Commission had
learnt a lesson from the inadequate
achievements  of the world commodity
agreements, realized the demands of
its association  commitments and adop-
ted the idea of concluding possible
regional product  agreements.  Other
innovations were also proposed -finan-
cing for regional projects and schemes
to support micro-projects  and small
businesses.  Particular  emphasis was
placed on a long-term  effort with rural
development. The Commission memo-
randum, however, was not followed up
on one important point - the creation
of free trade areas between the part-
ners. It was not to be followed on one
major symbolic point either - the terms
'association' and'associated countries'
were (in theory) to disappear  from
the vocabulary',  doubtless  because of
their colonial connotations.
In July 7973, negotiations began in
Brussels and, until the delegations took
their place in the Palais d'Egmont,
no-one knew whether all the countries
had accepted the invitation or not.
No-one knew either if they would
choose to negotiate the same type of
relations with the Community.  But they
did', and they were all there! The 19
AASM, the countries of the Common-
wealth and the rest - Ethiopia, Guinea,
Liberia and more. They all chose to
explore the same road, the one that led
to the most ambitious goal - an overall
cooperation agreement.  And they also
decided to negotiate through  a single
spokesman.
And so the group of African, Caribbean
and Pacific States (ACP) was born. For
the first time, French speaking  and
English-speaking Africans found them-
selves side-by-side in a collective under-
taking dealing together with an external
partner.
Thus the most extensive  cooperation
agreement  in the history of North-
South relations was produced. This is
what gave real historical  importance to
the Lom6 Convention  that was signed
with pomp and circumstance  in the
capital of Togo on 28 February 197 5.
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The relationship  between Yaound6 and
Lom6 is obvious. Yaound6 was both
experimental  and transitional,  for the
association oscillated between two eras
and was never very prominent  in Com-
munity life. Lom6, on the other hand
inaugurated a cooperation policy of a
different dimension. The movement of
history, a world-wide agreement in-
volving both the old, white, European
world and virtually all the black world,
the most sophisticated cooperation
methods - all this gave Lom6 an alto-
gether different political significance.
But the Nine were not to restrict this
undertaking  to relations between
Europe and the ACP group . . . I
Agreements with the countries
of Aftic?, the Caribbean
and the Pacific
7957 - The Treaty of Rome regulates relations between  the EEC and
the dependent Overseas  Countries and Territories in an Implementing
Convention.
1963 - The first convention of association  between the Community
and 18 independent States of Africa (the AASM) is signed in Yaound6
on 20 July.
1969 - The Yaound6 Convention  is renewed on 29 July.
-  The Arusha Agreement between the Community  and the three
countries of the Ehst African Community, Kenya, Tanzania and
Uganda, is signed on 24 September.
I97 3 - Protocol No 22, annexed  to the Acts of Accession to the Com-
munity of the United Kingdom, offers 20 independent Common-
wealth countries the possibility of negotiating their future relations
with the Community.
I97 5 - The Lom6 Convention  between the Community and 46 inde-
pendent States of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (the ACP
countries) is signed on 26February.
1979 - Lom6 II is signed with 57 ACP countries on 31 October.
1983 - The inaugural  session of the negotiations to renew the Lom6
Convention  is held on 6 October with 64 ACP countries (seven more
having joined since 1979).ffi  E,UROPE_SOUTH  DIALOGUE
Mediterranean arrrbif,ons
The Treaty of Rome gave the Commu-
nity of the Six commitments in Africa
and in the Mediterranean.  Would the
enlarged Community  succeed with an
operation of similar size in the one
latter area as it had in the former? That
was its intention . . .
Up until 1972,the Community  had con-
cluded  a series of agreements with the
countries  of the Mediterranean  basin.
Some were European countries, from
Greece to Spain, and others were in
North Africa. But, in 1977, the Com-
mission's assessment of its record was
somewhat  low-key. The considerable
overlap of political and economic
interests, it said, and the influence that
Europe could have in this region made
it possible to see the development of the
Mediterranean  basin as a natural exten-
sion of European integration.  The
agreements concluded  with these
countries were an inadequate expres-
sion of the interest Europe had in the
region. The Community  had so far only
made a limited contribution to the econ-
omic development of this part of the
world.
In October 1972, the Heads of State or
Government of the CommunitY heard
this appeal and, dt their Paris summit,
said that the Community  attached  vital
importance to the implementation  of
its commitments with the countries of
the Mediterranean  with which agree-
ments had been or were to be con-
cluded, and that these agreements
were to be the subject of an overall
and balanced approach. A few months
later, the Commission proposed agree-
ments of unlimited duration to the
countries  south of the Mediterranean.
These would involve overall cooper-
ation comprising, in addition  to pref-
erential trade arrangements,  various
tvpes of financial and technical assis-
tance.
However, it was by no means  easY to
harmonize  the European negotiating
mandates. Although theY were all
aware of the political and economic
advantages  of such cooperation, they
found it hard to remember them when
it came to deciding on precise conces-
sions, particularly in the agricultural
sector. Europe's Mediterranean agri-
culiure was already sick . . .
The negotiations too were long and
arduous.  They were divided into two
successive  parts. They were conducted
simultaneously with Algeria, Morocco
and Tunisia from 1974 to 1976. The
agreements  were signed on three
successive  days. Success, despite every-
thing! In Rabat, Claude Cheysson, the
European Development  Commissioner
of the period, said that EuroPe was
embarking on a dialogue with Morocco
and its Maghreb neighbours as it would
soon be doing with the Mashreq
countries and as it had already done
with the whole of Black Africa through
the Lom6 Convention . . . On their
side, he said, there was a clear desire to
achieve Arab unity . . . leaping over the
colonial period and into brotherly good-
will, they were re-establishing their link
with Black Africa . . . If they stood
back, they would see an extremelY
interesting picture in which each of the
greatunits -Africa,  the Arab world and
Europe - was trying to develoP its
cohesion  and asser{ its desire to be inde-
pendent and reject external inter-
vention,  in spite of vicissitude, conflict,
tension and threats. And each of these
units had resolutely decided  to support
the other two.
In 1.977, similar agreements were con-
cluded with Egypt, Jordan und SYria
and then with Lebanon and Israel. All
in all quite an impressive  picture. In
spite of the tension and conflict in this
part of the world -the troubles between
the Israelis and the Arabs are not the
only ones - it proved possible to weave
a network of cooperation with the
region as a whole. The southern Medi-
terranean economies  are more devel-
oped, nearer and, therefore,  more
directly competitive  than those of Black
Africa. This is why people said that the
southern Mediterranean  policy, which
was Lom6 transposed,  would be the real
test. But, unlike tom6, the overall
approach did not result in a collective
agreement.  Would the Euro-Arab
Dialogue,  launched in December  1973,
provide cooperation  between the two
shores of the Mediterranean  with the
dimension it lacked? n
The Mediterranean ageements
1963 - 12 September: Turkey (agreement setting up an association)
I970 - 29 June: Spain (preferential trade agreement creating a free-
trade area)
-  5 December: Malta (agreement setting up an association)
I972 -  22 July: Portugal (preferential  1,....1e agreement creating a
free-trade area)
- D December: Cyprus (agreement setting up an association)
I97 5 - 11 May: Israel (free-trade and cooperation  agreement)
t976 -25 April: Tunisia (overall cooperation  agreement)
-26 April: Algeria (overall cooperation  agreement)
-27 April: Morocco (overall cooperation  agreement)
1977 - 18 January: Egypt (overall cooperation  agreement)
Jordan (overall cooperation  agreement)
Syria (overall cooperation  agreement)
- 3 May: Lebanon (overall cooperation  agreement)
1980 2 April: Yugoslavia (cooperation  agreement)
- 3 December: Portugal (agreement on assistance prior to
accession)
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graphical approach  could be overcome
by inviting the Community  and the
Member  States to advance on both
fronts at once.
From Yaound6 to Lom6 and from the
first agreements with Tunisia and
Morocco  to the network of Mediter-
ranean agreements,  progress on the
regional front was assured. There was
some progress on the world-wide front
too, although more tentative.
Priority for trade and food
Before 1,972, the Community  had intro-
duced a trade policy and a food aid
policy - two areas in which it could
capitalize on the powers expressly
provided  by the Treaty of Rome - for
the Third World as a whole.
Very early on, the Community's  trade
policy towards the Third World was far
more open than that of the other great
economic powers and the developing
countries' trade balance with the EEC
showed a substantial credit between
1.962 and 1970, although theY were
running  a large deficit with the rest of
the world. An even more explicit illus-
tration of this is the decisive role which
the Community  played in setting up the
generalized system of preferences,  the
idea of which had been adopted by
Unctad in 1964. The CommunitY was
the first to apply it, in Juiy i 971 (see
inset).
The Community  was able to undertake
its food aid programmes because of the
powers it held to enact the common
commercial policy and the common
agricultural policy. ln 1967 , for
example,  during the Kennedy Round of
tariff negotiations, it joined the conven-
tion on food aid under the International
Grains ;\r'rangement,  undertaking  to
supply more than 1 000 000 tonnes of
World-wide cooperation
The attempt to define a Community
development policy that went beyond
the association  framework dates back
to the Commission's  1'971memoran-
dum, a fundamental  document which
the Community has yet to exploit to
the full.
The time had come to define a Commu-
nity policy, the Commission began by
arguing, because, at a time when the
Community  was setting off along the
road towards economic and mone-
tary union and was preparing for en-
largement, it was important that it
should also express  its desire to link its
own progress with the progress of the
developing countries and to include in
its aims a systematic  search for a better
international distribution of well-being
and greater opportunity for social
fulfilment  for increasingly wide-spread
groups of once underprivileged  people.
The Community (the Commission went
on to say), whose attraction for the
whole of the Third World would inevi-
tably increase over the years to come,
could not remain as ill-equipped as it
was then for the task of helping the
progress of all the developing countries.
Outside its association  policy, its only
instruments in fact were its trade policy
(which would have increasingly limited
means) and food aid.
The declaration  of the Paris Summit of
October 1,972 was a turning p.oint. By
giving the Community a very broad
mandate, it avoided the legal and poli-
tical obstacles which had impeded the
Community before and it laid the poli-
tical foundations for a practical start to
the process of defining  a Community
development policy. It also showed
that the opposition between the'univer-
salists'who wanted the Community to
adopt a world-wide approach to deve-
lopment problems and the'regionalists'
who preferred a more limited geo-
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wheat or other cereals everv vear for
three years.
However, its decisions to send dairy
products as food aid was taken autono-
mously, in April 1969, as one of the
measures  to dispose of dairy surpluses.
These programmes  have been expanded
since then, but, what is more important,
the Community  has tried, as the Com-
mission's many proposals  since I972
show, to turn this much-criticized
instrument into a tool for development.
To these first two aspects - trade pref-
erences and food aid - a third was
added, financial  and technical aid out-
side the Convention,  something that is
still, somewhat  anachronistically,  called
aid to the non-associated  developing
countries (see inset).As  early as l97l
the Commission  felt that the Commu-
nity should gradually be given the
wherewithal  to run a proper develop-
ment cooperation policy . . . one that
was better balanced  geographically
speaking and took the diversity of situ-
ations in the developing countries into
account.
But the first programme was not de-
cided upon until I976, after the Lom6
Convention had been signed, and it in-
Budgets
The Community has the European  Development  Fund (EDF) to
finance the bulk of its cooperation with the ACP countries, an annual
budget for other development activities (aid for the Maghreb and
Mashreq countries, aid to the non-associated developing  countries,
food aid, emergency aid and aid via NGOs), and, finally, the resources
of the European  Investment  Bank (EIB) for loans to the ACP coun-
tries, the Maghreb, and Mashreq countries,  and Israel. Cooperation
with th,e ACP and MMI (Maghreb, Mashreq and Israel) countries is
implemented  under multiannual agreements.
Financial resources
Lom6 II (ACP, 1981-85)
Financial protocols
(MMI, 1982-86)
Annual budget
: 5th EDF + EIB : 5.7
: Budget + EIB : 0.97
: in 1979  : 0.43
in 1983  :  1.05
Source:  EEC. (in I 0A0 million  ECU)
The increase in the annual budget reflects the Community's  desire to
achieve more of a balance between its aid to the ACP group and what
it gives the rest of the world. Actual expenditure recorded for the two
years given as examples are further proof of a real effort here.
Geographical breakdown  of total expenditure
ACP countries
Non-ACP countries
Total
1979
ss7 (6s%)
306 (3s%)
863
1983
e03 (60%)
s86 (4a%)
I 489
Source:  EEC. (in million ECU)
The generaltzed system of preferences (GSP)
The aim of the GSP is to encourage industrialization
in the Third World by providing preferential treat-
ment for its exports. It consists of special customs
arrangements  (exemptions from or reductions in
duties, with or without quantitative limits) applied
by the industrialized countries to products origina-
ting in the developing  countries. The word 'prefe-
rences' is used because these products are given a
customs advantage over products from the industria-
lized world. The system is 'generalized', because the
preferences  are granted to all developing  countries
by most industrialized countries for the majority of
products. And lastly, it amounts to a 'system' be-
cause the industrialized  countries give the same sort
of concessions,  but have their own arrangements  for
applying them (there is a Japanese scheme, an
American  scheme  and so on).
The Community  scheme currently covers 127 inde-
pendent countries and 22 dependent territories,  all
finished and semi-finished industrial products,
textile products and a large number of processed
agricultural products.
Sixty-eight per cent of the developing countries'
exports to the Community already enjoy duty-free
access (as against 22o/" of their exports to the USA
and l9"h of their exports to Japan). A further 20"/"
are exempted from customs duties on entry to the
Community  by virtue of the GSP.
The most advanced countries have derived the
greatest benefit from the system. In 1982, 12 coun-
tries (Brazil, Romania, Yenezuela, Hong Kong,
South Korea, India, Kuwait, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, Thailand and Singapore) accounted  for 73%
of all exports to the EEC under the GSP. To help the
others make more use of its scheme, the Community
has replaced the old global ceilings and quotas by
individual  limits for each country. The least devel-
oped countries get additional 4dvantages (in parti-
cular, duty-free entry for all agricultural products
imported under the GSP, and duty-free entry and
no quantitative  limits for industrial and textile prod-
ducts).
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volved only a very small sum -25 mll'
lion ECU. Unlike aid to the ACP and
southern  Mediterranean  countries, aid
to the non-associated  countries is deci-
ded annually when the budget is adop-
ted. The programme, gradually in-
creased since I976 (234 million ECU in
1983), primarily goes to the countries of
Latin America (20%) and Asia (75%).
It is strictly specialized: the only projects
covered are those to do with rural de-
velopment and regional integration, the
latter being a priority according to the
I97I memorandum, in view of the
Community's  special task of helping the
developing countries to organrze or
boost their economic cooperation  at re-
gional level. Priority for rural develop-
ment was only implicitly  indicated by
the preference  that was proposed for the
least developed countries. It was to be
made explicit in a further memorandum
from the Commission in October I974.
This said that the coverage of food re-
quirements should be a priority, as the
effective long-term complement to
short- and medium-term  food aid
schemes.
Towards a change in the
geographical  balance
The Nine were to acquire two other in-
struments  which could be used through-
out the Third World.
Thanks to the European Parliament's
initiative, it has been providing support
for NGO (non-governmental  organi-
zations) projects since I976. This pro-
gramme,  which expanded  from 3 mil-
lion to 30 million ECU between 1976
and 1983, has proved a very valuable
addition to Community  policy. The
NGOs are geared to micro-projects
carried out at grassroots level and with
the active and direct involvement  of
ordinary Europeans.  Their experience
was to exert a considerable  influence on
Community development  aid thinking.
Emergency aid is the EEC's means of
helping countries of the Third World
that are hit by disasters - and there is
no shortage of them, 'associated'  coun-
tries ornot! The Community  began with
a substantial and rather special scheme.
InI974,it proposed  to the UN an inter-
national emergency  operation  for those
developing countries worst hit by the oil
crisis, announcing that it would make a
contribution of USD 500 million. Since
then, many more (smaller)  emergency
aids have been decided, often with
emergency food aid as well. A very large
percentage  of emergency  aid has gone
to refugees.
So since 1972, there has been a certain
shift in the balance betwe€n regional
and contractual  schemes for ACP and
Mediterranean  countries and world-
wide operations for the Third World as
a whole. In financial  terms, the diffe-
rence between the budgets  is getting
smaller . . . and. if all forms of aid are
counted, it is India that is the leading
beneficiary  of Community assistance!
However,  these unilateral schemes  are
not an adequate  response to the expec-
tations of the non-associated  countries
which often have dynamic economic
relations (sometimes  conflicting, as in
the case of textiles) with the Communi-
ty. So it is not surprising that agree-
ments have been concluded with several
countries of Asia and Latin America
(see inset). These tend to be trade co-
operation  agreements  and they some-
times also involve region al ot ganiza-
tions (Asean in 1980 and the Andean
Pact in 1984).
A pattern  is emerging, but it is still
somewhat  sketchy. In 1.982, the Com-
mission recommended in its latest
memorandum that the CommunitY
should try to enrich the contractual
Aid for the non-associated
countnes
In L982,the budget for the non-associated  countries was 210.2 million
ECU. 10 times the first allocationin  L976. This is still only a modebt
effort, but if bilateral aid from the Tenl is taken into account, Europe
emerges as a major donor throughout the world. In Latin Arrierica,
the Community and the Member States are the biggest souree.of  aid
for most countries, from Brazil and Mexico to Peru and Nicaragua.
The Community  is the biggest donor in several large countries  in Asia,
such as India and Indonesia. In other cases, Japan or the World Bank
give more than the Community, although its aid is still considerable.
Expenditure on aid in t982
Asia
India
Bangladesh
Bhutan
Nepal
Indonesia
Thailand
Asean
46
23.6
3.4
3.7
Lt.6
17 .2
0.03
105.6 Total
Latin America
Costa Rica
Dominica
Haiti
Honduras
Nicaragua
Andean Pact
Central'America
(regional aid)
18
L2
6.6
16.9
9.8
0.7
2
Total 66.0
Africa
Angola
Mozambique
Total
Disasters
Research
Technical aid
9.7
5.5
4
Total  L9.2
8.7
L0.7
19.4
Grand total 2I0.2
Source:  EEC. (in 1 000 million ECU)
The non-associated countries also get food aid from the Community
(see inset), emergency  aid (81.5 million ECU in 1982), trading facili-
ties and preferential access to the EEc market under the generalued
system of preferences  (see inset).
I Except Ireland, Greece and Luxembourg.
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content of these agreements, thereby
giving more substance and continuity to
joint schemes and making for trade
arrangements  covering longer periods.
Along the same lines, the Commission
proposed  strengthening relations
between the EEC and Latin America in
April 1984.
This review of the Europe-South  dia-
logue over the past 25 years would be
incomplete without a mention of
Europe's role in the North-South Dia-
logue, i.e. the series of major inter-
national negotiations that have marked
the past two decades and are aimed at
creating a new balance in economic
relations between  the indus triallzed
and the developing countries.
The results of these global negotiations
have not lived up to expectations,  in the
Third World at least. And the present
North-South Dialogue deadlock may
make what the Community has done
in this field look unimportant However,
it is worth noting that the present dead-
lock is not its fault and that it has often
been an irreplaceable mediator be-
tween North and South - which has
sometimes  demanded considerable
effort to reach internal agreement first.
The role of mediator  is more or less
forced upon it by economic interdepen-
dence and by the way the countries of
the South see Europe. For, between  the
Eastern Bloc countries, which are in-
different, and the USA, which is ill in-
clined to change a system which keeps it
on top, Europe,  a significant  economic
power but only a moderate political
power, is the obvious channel for any
reform. So the Community is, inevit-
ably, a source of constant hope and fre-
quent disappointment  for the Third
World. I
Agreements with Asia
and Latin Amenca
Latin America
There are outline commercial cooperation and (non-preferential) eco-
nomic agreements  linking the Community to Brazil (18 September
1980) and Mexico (15 July 1975). They last five years and can be re-
newed automatically.
Uruguay.' A non-preferential  trade agreement,  signed on 2 April1973
for a three-year period; renewable automatically.
Andean Pact (Bolivia, Ecuador,  Colombia,  Peru and Venezuela): An
outline economic,  trade (non-preferential)  and development agree-
ment, signed on L 7 December 1983 , for a five-year period; automati-
cally renewable.
Asia
India: A non-preferential commercial and economic cooperation
agreement,  signed on 23 June 1981 for a five-year period; automati-
cally renewable.
Asean (Indonesia,  Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand):
A non-preferential  economic,  commercial and development coopera-
tion agreement,  signed on7 March 1980 for five years; automatically
renewable.
Non-preferential commercial  cooperation agreements have been
signed between the Community and China (3 April 1978), Bangladesh
(19 October t976), Pakistan  (1 January I976) and Sri Lanka (22 July
I975). All are for five years and are renewable automatically.
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New directions
In the early 1980s, development was tn
a state of crisis. Growth in the devel-
oped countries had slowed down and
then stopped. Recession had set in.
Although the developing countries had
experienced relatively strong growth in
the preceding  decades, the development
process  had all too often not taken root.
The record at the end of the second de-
velopment decade was disappointing,
as everyone agreed, and, with the crisis,
the outlook was even more discoura-
ging.
The Third World's debt alone was
enough to block any voluntarist  devel-
opment policy. And financial resources
were dwindling dramatically.  In t982,
the price of many commodities was not
even half what it had been in the 1950s.
And lastly, oil, exorbitantly priced, bit
deep into the slender reserves of foreign
exchange that were so essential for
food imports - which were also increas-
ing fast. Hunger struck massivelY
once more.
Food strategies
The Development  Ministers of
the Ten decided on L4 June 1982
to launch the experiment  known
as 'food strategies'. The aim is to
get the Third World to feed itself,
by giving the peasant farmer an
incentive to grow more and the
certainty that he can sell his Pro-
duce afterwards.  How is this to be
done? By paying the producer a
good price for his crop, of course,
but also by develoPing Proper
storage and marketing facilities.
The peasant farmer also needs
fertiluer, pesticide, tools and
farm machinery and this means
setting up  small businesses,
keeping country areas regularlY
supplied and setting uP a decent
system of rural credit. If he is to
join the money economy, the
peasant farmer will need to be
taught what that involvdS bY
competent people. And all these
efforts will be pointless unless at
the end of the day he can buY in
his own district the sort of con-
sumer goods that will imProve  his
standard  of living.
So taking all this into account,
each country must work out its
own food strategy, with its atten-
dant aims and policies. Only then
can it attract support from the
Community, the Member States
and perhaps other donors, the
important  thing being that foreign
aid is properly coordinated and
fits in with a coherent national
development plan.
Four ACP countries -  Mali,
Zambra, Kenya and Rwanda -
have already begun Pilot schemes
with the EEC to test the Commu-
nity's new approaih. A 'Pact' has
been signed with the Commu-
nity, which has undertaken to
support these countries for as
long as they stick to the aims theY
have set themselves.
In  Mali, the CommunitY is
backing an agricultural reorgani-
zation programme  launched in
1980; an initial reform of the
cereal market has alreadY im-
proved supplies to the towns. The
idea in Kenya is to re-attain the
self-sufficiency of the past. Pri-
ority here will be given to reform-
ing  marketing channels. In
Zambia, the aim is to develoP
food crops that have been aban-
doned for the mining sector bY
running schemes to helP small
farmers. In Rwanda, a balanced
food situation is threatened bY
the increasing scarcitY of land as
the population grows. Agricul-
tural output has to be increased
if the country's needs are to be
met in the year 2000.
Although the CommunitY  has
decided to restrict this exPeri-
ment to four countries for the
time being, there is no shortage
of candidates, either in Africa
(Tanzania, Senegal, Niger, etc.)
or the rest of the Third World.
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Given this crisis in development, there
were invevitably  second thoughts about
cooperation in both North and South.
Some people questioned  the whole idea
(a temptation  for the American admin-
istration); others, in Europe for
example, looked at ways to improve
cooperation, to make it more dffective
while preserving its achievements  to
date. This is the path the Community
has chosen  to follow in the 1980s.
Priority for rural
developmenf
What set the Community  thinking on
these lines? Not surprisingly, it was the
problem of hunger, the most dramatic
aspect of the crisis in the South. The real
starting point was a big debate which the
European Parliament held in October
1,979, when European Commissioner
Claude Cheysson  said that the rural sec-
tor had to have absolute priority, not
just because it was in the villages that
society and culture had their roots in all
countries, but because  the rural world
held the key to their survival and devel-
opment. The following year, Parlia-
ment approved an important report by
the Italian communist, Bruno Ferrero.
Then, a few months later, Edgard Pi-
sani, the new European Development
Commissioner, got the Community  to
adopt a plan of action to combat hunger
in the world, thereby setting Commis-
sion policy in its new direction  right
away.
The Commission  rejected the plan for
immediate and massive aid that Marco
Pannella,  the Italian radical Euro-MP,
so resoundingly proposed, opting in-
stead for long-term  structural solutions.
'The age-old ills of hunger and poverty
are the result of a system of economic,
political and social power; they are
rooted in individual mentalities. and
power centres are their counterpart'
wrote Edgard Pisani in a letter to Marco
Pannella. 'Wars and conflicts constantly
make.things  worse. They cannot be
cured, as people thought, by showers of
equipment and sacks of wheat. Curing
them is a long and arduous  task for
several generous and determined  gen-
erations who are inspired by a rigorous,
balanced vision of the world and of
society.'
The Community  did not, however,
ignore the urgency of the matter. The
action plan included immediate  meas-
ures, in particular substantial food and
financial aid for refugees. But the essen-
tial thing was not the several million
ECU that the European ministers
ended up allocating: it was that the plan
confirmed  rural development  and self-
sufficiency in food as top priorities and
cast doubts on the traditional use of
certain means of cooperation, parti-
cularly food aid. .
In the priority sector of food, the Com-
mission decided to launch an experi-
ment, to try another form of coopera-
tion. In 1,982, the Community  offered
four countries its support in imple-
menting a food strategy  (see inset). This
technocratic term masks what is in fact
quite a simple idea, although it is a
revolutionary one that will take a great
deal of patience and tenacity to put into
practice.
The idea of food strategies took hold
when it became clear that, in spite of the
priority given to the rural sector (which
received 40% of EDF aid under Lom6
II), the Community  was getting the
same disappointing  results as other,less
policy-conscious, donors. Why?
Because of a lack of coherence between
foreign aid (itself uncoordinated)  and
the efforts of the recipient countries, as
regards both resources and general
policy. The important thing is of course
to organize donors' contributions and
recipients'efforts around a policy that is
clearly defined and systematically
implemented.  In short, if agriculture  is
to take off, cooperation  must stop
being rudimentary!
So cooperation  must be better orga-
nued. more structural.  less determined
by short-term  economic needs. In other
words, a longer-term exercise. In addi-
tion, there is a need for transnational
schemes  to preserve  the natural
environment - halting the advance of
the desert, handling problems of water
supply, preserving livestock, and so on.
The first programmes are already under
way.They are still modest,  but they
show the way ahead.
Economic emancipation
for the Third World
In September 1,982, the Commission
produced a further memorandum on
the Community's  development policy.
A decade had gone by since the 1972
memorandum which had, for the first
time, attempted to define how Europe
saw aid to the Third World. Was it now
rejecting the past and its achievements?
By no means! But the Commission's
new document starts with a frank look
at the failures of development and the
disappointing  results of cooperation.
The Commission's  1982 memorandum
was intended - although this was not
well enough understood - to be a politi-
cal act aimed at Europe itself. Its
opening words are proof of this: 'De-
velopment  policy is a cornerstone of
European integration . . .'. In spite of
the crisis and in spite of its difficulties,
the Community  wants to maintain and
strengthen its commitment  to the Third
World . . . asentiment  not, alas, shared
by everyone on both sides of the
Atlantic.
This commitment  of course has finan-
cial implications.  The memorandum
proposes that Community aid be
doubled in 10 years. But the Commis-
sion is primarily  aiming at an improve-
ment in the quality of its aid, for the
value of the Community's  contribution
to North-South relations, modest in
volume, lies in the fact that it is experi-
mental, innovatory and exemplary.
So past achievements  are to be preser-
ved * cooperation  based on contracts,
freely negotiated and accompanied  by
guarantees  as to duration and, above
all (can anyone do better?), total
respect for individual political and ideo-
logical options. These are the charac-
teristics  of the agreements with the ACP
and the southern Mediterranean
countries that have to be developed.
The Community  must consolidate  the
network of contractual relations it has
built up with the Third World and put
it on a more systematic  basis, the mem-
orandum argues, thereby contributing
to the establishment of a system of
international relations that is more
harmonious. safer and more in line with
the interests  of all countries.
With this political achievement  as a
basis, it is possible to do more for both
'cooperation' and development. More
dialogue, more consultation  and more
coordination  of our efforts, not just to
I6negotiate  the contract, but to imple-
ment it too - the logic is the same and
the respect for other people  is the same,
but the results in terms of development
may be quite different! So the new
method proposed for food strategies,'
and set out more systematically in the
memorandum, is not a break with the
past, but a continuation  of the original
concept of the Europe-South  Dialogue.
The memorandum also proPoses a
redefinition of the ultimate aim of
development. Behind the emphasis on
rural development and the anti-hunger
campaign lies the desire to radically
change the aid process by making it
serve an eminently political purpose: to
support anything that encourages less
dependent, more autonomous develop-
ment, in other words, to give Europe's
partners the wherewithal  to achieve
their economic - and therefore  cultural
and political - emancipation.
This is something we have heard a lot
about from Third World pundits for
many years and particularly from de-
veloping countries themselves  (cf. the
Africans'Lagos  plan). But putting it
into practice is a different proposition!
There are many obstacles to overcome -
economic and commercial structures
inherited from colonial times, the
'acquired rights' of cooperation agree-
ments (requested  by the developing
countries themselves)  that could in-
crease dependence,  cultural and techni-
cal arrogance  here, a tendency to copy
there . . . and vested interests every-
where. And are we sufficiently aware of
the challenge which a change in the
direction of development poses to
countries which still have fragile politi-
cal and administrative  structures and
teetering economies  and are forever
harassed  by everyday issues? Can they
count on Europe to commit itself to a
different future?
Timing of new measures
The Pisani memorandum of 1982 does
not, in itself, constitute a Community
decision.  The ministers of the Ten have
approved the main lines of the docu-
ment, although they have not yet given
their opinion on its financial  implica-
tions. So what we have is a policy state-
ment to refer to when the time is right to
put its proposals  into practice.
The first landmark  ahead is the expiry
of the second Lom6 Convention  in
February 1985. Negotiations  for re-
newal began in October 1983. The
Commission made no attemPt to hide
the difficutty of the undertaking  when it
proposed guidelines for a negotiating
mandate  to the Council:
'It is going to be difticult to decide on
the aims and ground rules of an aP-
proach to cooperation  which must
prove durable if it is to continue to set
an example.
It is going to be difficult, in the depths
of recession. to think ahead into the
distant future.
It is going to be difficult to pay enough
attention to Third World development
now that East-West has eclipsed North-
South.
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It is going to be difficult to come to
terms with the fact that for the countries
of the Third World, development does
not mean copying us; and that food aid
is not primarily a way of disposing of
surpluses.
It is going to be difficult to get it across
that a million fuel-efficient stoves are
worth more than one monster dani and
that improving  the yields of 100 000
bush farmers is more important than
setting up a modern farm.
It is going to be difficult to see that tools
serve man rather than vice versa.
It is going to be difficult to explain to
certain  governments  that the fault lies in
their methods  or the priorities they
have adopted.
Food aid
In L982, the European  Commu-
nity spent 700 million ECU on
food aid (the figure was 500 mil-
lion ECU in 1981) to more than
60 developing countries (and
several organizations),  notablY
Bangladesh, Egypt, India and
the ACP countries (36% of the
programme in 1'982).
For L983, the Commission Pro-
posed. that the food aid Pro-
gramme should consist of
1 043 000 tonnes of  cereals,
150 000 tonnes of milk Powder,
46 000 tonnes of  butteroil,
10 000 tonnes ofsugar and 6 150
tonnes of vegetable oil, with the
possibility of delivering other
products dried fish, certain
vegetables, olive oil - as well.
Most of the cereals allocation is
wheat or wheat flour bought on
the Community market. Other
cereals are, however, also Pro-
vided in view of the eating habits
in some of the recipient countries.
Cereals were sent to 20 coun-
tries, most of them in the least
developed group (LDCs), in
1982. Egypt and Bangladesh  get
the biggest quantities, followed
by Sri Lanka and Somalia.
The Community provides about
two thirds of all the dairy prod-
ucts which the developing coun-
tries receive as aid. In 1982, milk
powder was distributed to 33
countries and five international
organizations. Butteroil (dehY-
drated butter) went to 29 coun-
tries and five organrzations.  Aid
to India in dairy products de-
serves a special mention: in 1'977  ,
this country applied to the Com-
munity for 300 000 tonnes over a
seven-year period. With the Pro-
ceeds of the sale of these prod-
ucts, India is setting up a modern
dairy industry supplied by 10
million rural families.
In response to a request from the
developing countries, the Com-
munity is extending  its range of
products to include, in particular,
sugar (especially for Palestinian
refugees), vegetable oil (Thai,
Afghan and Nicaraguan refu-
gees) and other products such as
millet. beans and white maize
(Central America).
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It is going to be difficult to turn the
welfare cases into productive  econo-
mies and foster their growth step by
step.'
Another landmark will be the conclu-
sion of the negotiations on enlargement
of the Community  to include Spain and
Portugal, though their outcome is still
uncertain. What will the Twelve's rela-
tions be with the countries south of the
Mediterranean?  The Community  and
the Member  States,  says the Commis-
sion, must attach great importance to
what they do in the Mediterranean,
where politically much is at stake . . .
Food aid for development
The Community has been holding inter-
nal discussions on a reform of food aid
for the past L0 years. In March 1983,
the Commission returned to the attack
after having had a number of expert
reports and assessments drawn up.
All the specialists agreed that food aid
could not, in the immediate future, be
cut out, nor even reduced overall. The
FAO said that the developing countries
would need an estimated 200 million
tonnes of cereal imports by the end of
the century. Unicef said that the
number of children with serious nutri-
tional deficiencies would increase from
400 million to 600 million over the next
20 years.
Until the developing countries can
produce enough to meet these
enormous  needs -and this is the priority
target - food aid will be essential.
But, as the assessment  reports confirm,
food aid can have perverse  effects that
are not intended if it is not part of an
agricultural development policy. The
Commission has laid down the condi-
tions for this - food aid must be an inte-
gral part of a development programme
(except in the case of emergency aid);
there must be prior consultation with
the recipient  country to see that it is,
supply contracts  should cover periods of
several years, products must be bptter
adapted  to needs and there should  be
triangular operations to supply food
products bought in another developing
country.
The main lines of these proposals  were
approved by the European ministers in
November 1983.It had taken the Com-
munity 10 years to define a food aid
policy for development! I
estones
1968 - The Community's first food aid operations
under the Kennedy Round.
L97 | - Introduction  of the Community's  scheme of
generalized preferences for all developing countries.
Commission memorandum on a Community de-
velopment cooperation policy.
1,972 -  The Paris Summit of Heads of State or
Government lays down guidelines for a world-wide
development cooperation policy.
1973 - Commission  memorandum  on future rela-
tions between the Community,  the then AASM and
the countries of Africa, the Caribbean  and the Indian
and Pacific Oceans (the Deniau report).
197 4 - Commission memorandum  on development
aid 'A fresco of Community action tomorrow' (the
Cheysson memorandum).
197 5 - The Commission's action programme for
non-associated  developing countries.
1981 - The Commission's  action plan to combat
hunger in the world, following debates in the Euro-
pean Parliament.
1982 - Commission  memorandum  on Community
development policy (the Pisani memorandum).
1983 - Commission communication  on food aid for
development.B I-omEIntroduction
Lomb is not the sole component of
Community dev elopment p olicy,
but it is the main one. This is true
financially - the Lom6 Convention
represents on average 5I % of Com-
munity aid every year - and in terms
of the number of partners involved:
the ACP group, 46-strong when
Lom6 I was signed, has 64 members
now. If Angola and Mozambique,
and then an independent lr{amibia,
join the Lom€ Convention, it will
include the whole of Black Africa as
well as the Caribbean and Pacific
countries.
Lom6 is also the most elaborate
policy. It involves a system of coop-
eration that is world-wide  as well as
collective. It is a symbol for the
Community and of North-South
relations - and there lies both its
strength and its weakness, for the
hopes it has generated turn to disap-
pointment at its slightest short-
coming. 1
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One policr several instrume
Two conventions have already been
called after the capital of Togo. But
more than just the name of an agree-
ment, Lom6 has come to mean a policy,
a certain way of tackling the dialogue
between the developed countries and
the Third World. There are four basic
characteristics  to the 'Lom6 spirit',
which implies:
(i) lasting cooperation,  based on legally
binding arrangements set down in a
contract that has been freely negotiated
by the partners to it;
(ii) a collective agreement between two
regional groups, based on respect for
the political and social options of each
partner;
(iii) an overall approach  that defines
and combines  all instruments of coop-
eration (Lom6 combines  trade and aid,
and in doing so rejects the somewhat
doctrinal 'trade not aid' approach);
(iv) continuous dialogue (admittedly
difficult and sometimes disappointing in
practice) between two groups of coun-
tries whose degrees  of collective organi-
zation are both inadequate and un-
equal.
The negotiators of the first Lom6 Con-
vention took over and added to the
range of instruments provided  by the
Yaound6 Conventions. Lom6 II was to
contain further additions.
Opening up the Community
market
As soon as Lom6 I took effect, almost
all (99%) of ACP products could enter
the Community  market free of customs
duties and equivalent taxes, and in un-
limited quantities. This principle  of free
and unlimited access could not be
applied, however, to certain products
covered  directly or indirectly by the
common agricultural  policy - although
these generally benefit from preferen-
tial treatment  in comparison with the
same products from third countries.
With this agreed, there was little room
for further progress, yet Lom6 II was
able to make certain concessions  for
some agricultural  products. But the
Community has not so far agreed to
include the principle of totally free and
unrestricted  access in the Convention.
In order to encourage  the partners'
exports, the Conventions contain parti-
cularly favourable arrangements  re-
garding rules of origin. The ACP States
are considered  as a single customs terri-Experience was to show, as it did under
Yaound6, that free trade arrangements
were not enough in themselves to
ensure thattrade actually developed.  So
as well as running EDF schemes to
boost ACP production potential and
competitive  capaci ty, tr ade promotion
had to be extended too. Lom6 II was to
provide special measures for this - a
specific allocation and a broader defini-
tion of what constituted trade pro-
motion.
Stabilizing export earnings
Compared to the earlier association
agreements,  Lom6's most significant
innovations lie unquestionably  in the
field of commodities.
At the time of the negotiations for the
first Convention,  raw materials were
on the agenda of international discus-
sions and figured large amongst the
developing countries'  demands. The
European Commission had suggested
introducing interim or additional
measures in the shape of agreements of
more limited geographical scope.
This was the birth of Stabex, the first
system to guarantee  a group of de-
veloping countries'compensation' for
losses in export earnings. The unde-
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niable importance  of the new system
has sometimes  led people to forget its
limitations. Stabex was never intended
to do anything about unstable  raw
material prices. Only world-wide solu-
tions could handle that problem. Nor
could it ensure any indexation  of ACP
commodity  export earnings.  Stabex
was designed to cushion  the shocks
arising from significant losses of ACP
export earnings due to drops in prices
or sales and to do so within the limits
of its five-year  allocation.
Not all commodities are covered, but
the list of those that are - 29 originally,
47 now -has been extended  a lot and
includes most agricultural  primary
products and some partially processed
products (vegetable  oils and cocoa
paste). Dependence  thresholds, i.e.
the percentage  of the country's exports
that the product  has to represent,  were
fixed at a reasonable  level - 6.5%
generally speaking,  but only 2"/" inthe
case of the least developed countries.
The guarantee  was extended,  its appli-
cation made more flexible and the fund
was increased  by 46% from Lom6I to
Lom6 II. Under Lom6 I, all eligible
requests were met, but difficulties arose
during the course of Lom6 II. In 1980
and 1981-, there was not enough  money
nts
tory, which makes it easier for them to
achieve the degree of processing re-
quired by the EEC before they can
claim to have produced a product. For
example,  a product which could not be
imported into the Community  under the
label 'made in the Ivory Coast' because
it had been insufficiently processed in
that country could be imported as an
ACP product by counting earlier pro-
cessing in, say, Togo and Tanzania.
Furthermore,  the system of exceptions
to the rules makes it possible to take
individual  cases into account.  Although
few exceptions have been requested and
they have, in all but one case, been
accepted, the origin rules are one of the
bones of contention between  the Com-
munity and the ACP States. The ACP
group wants maximum flexibility, while
the Ten are determined to protect
themselves against the risk of trade
deflection.
The ACP countries are not required to
grant similar concessions  in return.
European  exports are no longer entitled
to the preferential  treatment they had
under the Yaound6 Convention.  The
Lom6 Convention now only guarantees
them against discrimination  in favour of
other developed  countries.ffiffi  THELOMEPOLICY
available when a coffee and cocoa price
slump coincided with bad harvests here
and there. Stabex, a limited form of
insurance,  could not cover needs 100"/",
and it became clear that it could only
provide temporary  relief when world
prices fluctuated  badly. But it has also
become clear that the relative security
it offers, combined with the preferential
arrangements  that ACP products enjoy
on the Community market, are not
enough to ensure that these products
are competitive.
Sugar - guaranteed  prices
The sugar protocol annexed to the Con-
vention  is quite as remarkable  an inno-
vation in the commodity  sector as
Stabex. The Community has in fact
gone a step further with this product,
which is of particular importance to the
economy of several ACP countries. The
idea is not just to stabilize earnings,  but
to tie the guaranteed price for ACP
sugar to the price which European pro-
ducers are guaranteed.
Not all ACP sugar exports are covered.
A ceiling of 1.3 million tonnes of raw
sugar was set and the total quantity
divided into quotas for each of the pro-
ducing countries.In 7975, this repre-
sented about 66% of all ACP exports.
Trends on the international sugar
market since I97 5 - depressed world
prices and much higher Community
prices - have given this guarantee  an
undeniable importance. But here again,
the preferential advantage and the
security offered by the sugar protocol
are not enough in themselves to guaran-
tee that ACP sugar production is com-
petitive and has a future.
Safeguarding  mining potential
With the exception of iron ore, which
was covered more or less by accident,
Stabex was only aimed at agricultural
commodities. The fact that mineral
products were excluded  obviously led
to an imbalance as far as the advan-
tages offered to the ACP countries
were concerned.  The majority of them
derived a certain guarantee  against
fluctuating export earnings from either
Stabex or the sugar protocol, but the
countries that exported mainly minerals
(Zambta and Zaire) not only got no
guarantee  for these products, but
received no benefit from Stabex
Stabex
Stabex, often called an insurance
system for bad years, compen-
sates for drops in export earnings
from certain ACP products
destined for the Community
market. It covers 46 agricultural
commoditiesl and, until 1984,
iron ore as well. A countrY is
eligible for a transfer if the prod-
uct in question represents  at
least 6.5% of total export earn-
ings (the dependence  threshold,
reduced to 5% in the case of
sisal) in the year preceding the
application.  The other condition
is that the drop in export earnings
must be at least 6.5% (the trigger
point) of average exports to the
EEC over the four previous years
(the reference period). There are
11 ACP countries which calculate
their trigger point on the basis
of total exports (all destinations)
because of their geographical
situation. The dependence  and
trigger thresholds are only 2"/"
in the case of the least develoPed
countries.
All recipient  States (other than
the least developed,  landlocked
and island countries) have to
repay Stabex transfers once the
level of their export earnings
makes this possible. The Council
of Ministers of the EEC may
demand total reimbursement  or
write the amount off.
Between 197 5 and 198 L, 700
million ECU-worth of Stabex
transfers were made to 44 coun-
tries (representing 61'% of the
total population of the ACP
Group). The least developed
countries got 40% of all trans-
fers.
The system was able to meet all
eligible requests during Lom6 I
(I97 5-79), when about 388
million ECU was transferred to
37 countries for 24 products
exported to the EEC. More than
two thirds of the transfers were
for three products - groundnuts
(40%), iron ore (16%) and
cotton (II%). The countries of
West Africa were the main bene-
ficiaries with 58.8% of the trans-
fers (Senegal alone receiving
17 .2s%\.
Stabex funds amounted to 550
million ECU - 12% of the 5th
EDF - under Lom6 II. This was
divided into five annual parts of
110 million ECU each, with the
possibility of drawing a 20%
advance from the following year
in addition. In 1980, the system
could only meet 52.8% of appli-
cations; coverage dropped to
42.8% in 1981. and it would
have been even lower without an
exceptional  financial effort on
the Community's part. In 1982,
however, claims were fully met.
t Th" rnui" p-ducts are timber, coffee,
cocoa, cotton, oilcake, groundnuts,
bananas, tea, hides and skins, palm oil
and rubber.THELOMEPOLICY  M
because their agricultural  exports failed
to reach the dependence level.
This 'inequality'was strongly felt at the
time of the negotiations for Lom6 II,
especially  since hopes of finding inter-
national solutions, particularly for
copper,  were dwindling. So Lom6 II
invented Sysmin, a system derived from
Stabex although noticeably different
from it. Sysmin covers six products
and is of potential  interest to a dozen
or so ACP countries. But, as experience
has shown, it is the big copper-pro-
ducing countries that are the main bene-
ficiaries.
Although it completes  the commodity
guarantee  system, Sysmin is also
intended to be part of a wider policy of
developing mining resources in the
ACP countries - a policy of interest to
the Community too, as a majorimporter
of raw materials. Special means (assis-
tance from the European Investment
Bank and investment protection) have
been provided for this by the Lomd
Convention.  The need for a more
dynamic policy here led the European
Commission to propose a series of
additional measures and a proper
energy and mining strategy  in Novem-
ber 1983. I
Sysmin
The main innovation of Lom6 II
was its introduction  of a system
providing some guarantee for
minerals. It  is not an export
earnings stabilization scheme.
Its main aim is to maintain or re-
establish existing production
capacity, through projects and
programmes  to assist the ACP
mining sector, when a substantial
drop in production capacity or
a drop in export earnings is re-
corded for one of the products on
the Sysmin list.
The system has a fund of 282
million ECU and covers six prod-
ucts - copper and cobalt, phos-
phates, manganese, bauxite and
alumina, tin, roasted iron pyrites
and iron ore. The total amount is
divided into five annual parts
with the possibility of advance
drawings on up to half of the
following year's allocation.
The only products covered are
those representing more than
E% of the total exports of the
ACP country in question  ( 10% in
the case of the least developed,
landlocked and island countries).
No transfer may involve more
than 50% of one of the annual
allocations. The drop in produc-
tion capacity must be of at least
rc%.
By the end of 1983, only a third
of the resources  available under
Lom6 II had been committed -
Zambia had received 55 million
ECU and Zaire 40 million ECU,
both for their copper industries.
Other applications under con-
sideration are from Guyana
(bauxite production), Rwanda
(tin) and, once again, Zambia
and Zaire (copper).
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The sugar
protocol
Under this agreement:
(i) the Community  under-
takes to buy fixed quantities
(about 1.3 million tonnes) of
white sugar from the signa-
tory supplier countries at the
price it guarantees its own
producers;
(ii) the suppliers undertake to
deliver their full quotas to the
Community, failing which
their quotas can be reduced
(except in cases of force ma-
jeure).
The 1.3 million tonnes cover-
ed by the protocol currently
represent 66% of total ACP
sugar exports, a figure that
has remained more or less
unchanged since the agree-
ment was signed. The Com-
munity produces about 12
million tonnes of sugar every
year and its annual consump-
tion is 9.5 million tonnes.
The prices offered on the
Community market have in-
creased regularly, going from
369 ECU per tonne of white
sugar in 1977 to 534 ECU in
1984. The world market
offers nothing like such stable
increases nor remunerative
prices, the figures being L37
ECU in 1977 and 199 ECU
in 1984, with a brief rise to
538 ECU in 1980.
The ACP signatories,  in order
of quota size ('000 tonnes of
white sugar) for L984l85,are:.
Mauritius (487.2), Fiji
(163.6), Guyana (157.7),
Jamaica (118.3), Swaziland
(IL6.4), Trinidad and Tobago
(69), Barbados (49.3), Bellze
(39 .4),  Zimbabwe (25),
Malawi (20), St Christopher
and Nevis (1a.8), Madagascar
(10), Tanzania (10), Congo
(8), Ivory Coast (2), Uganda
and Suriname (0). These last
two countries had their quotas
reduced to zero because they
failed to deliver their agreed
quantities. But they remain
signatories.  Similarly,  the
quotas of two other countries
have been reduced since the
protocol came into force. On
the other hand, two new coun-
tries -Zimbabwe (1980) and
the Ivory Coast (1984) - have
signed the protocol.E  THELOMEPOLICY
The means of development
The means available for financial  and
technical  cooperation have to be used to
achieve the aims of development  as
defined in the Conventions. The tend-
ency from one set of negotiations to
another has been to extend and clarify
these definitions to produce a veritable
catalogue of all possible  development
operations. The current negotiations
will no doubt add to the list, by in-
cluding, in particular, cultural coopera-
tion activities.
This diversity of aims has probably
meant that efforts have been rather
widely scattered,  but a review of pro-
jects actually implemented - the result
Lom6II marked an increase in the proportion of funds chanelled to the
rural sector, which is expected to absorb 44.2% of national allocations
(as distinct from regional project funds), compared to 34.87o under
Lomd I. This includes micro-projects. This increase is mainly at the
expense of transport and communications,  whose share has dropped
from 26.4% to 16.7"/".
The most common objectives are self-sufficiency  in food, better living
conditions for rural populations, the diversification of production and
higher productivity.
Lom6 II has partly altered the 'big project' approach by encouraging
involvement of local communities in an increasing number of inte-
grated rural projects. Local peasant farmers define the aims of these
projects, take part in the work and manage them. Micro-projects  are
also on the increase and non-governmental organizations  get more
support.
There is also increasing  emphasis on support for food crops - which is
taking more than two thirds of 5th EDF rural development allocations
- and less on cash crops.
Trends in project funding
lst - 3rd EDF 4th EDF 5th EDF
million
ECU
o,/ /o million
ECU
o/ /o million
ECU
o/ /o
Cash crops
Food crops
hydro-agricultural
integrated rural dev.
livestock & fisheries
Micro-projects
Total
285
219
1.22
48
49
s88 100
49
37
2l
8
8
249 40
341 54
62  10
r99  32
79  L2
193
6zt 1oo
33.5
65
14  1.5
93L 100
312
60s
Source: EEC.
of free choices by each of the partner
countries - reveals some dominant
areas.
For example, rural deverlopment pro-
jects absorb an increasing share of the
funds and 40"/" of the programmed
resources of the 5th EDF (Lom6 II)
have been allocated to them. These pro-
jects are increasingly concerned with
food crops and, to a lessier extent, cash
crops (see inset).
Other sectors where aid is on the in-
crease  are industrialization, energy and
mining. While the proportion  of furlds
allocated to transport and communi-
Rural developmentcations infrastructure  gradually de-
creased from the lst EDF to the 3rd,
the industrial sector has progressed,
accounting for 27% of funds committed
under Lomd II as against 19To under
Lom6I. So to a certain extent the facts
reflect the importance which the Lom6I
negotiators attached  to industrial
cooperation and which the second
Convention confirmed  (particularly as
regards the energy sector). Nonethe-
less, people gradually became con-
vinced that industrial development
could not really take off without more
private investment. Various measures
to encourage private investment were
introduced in the first two Conventions,
including the creation of a Centre for
Industrial  Development.  The current
negotiations should provide an oppor-
tunity to reinforce these measures.
The'toolbox'
The Conventions have tried to meet
the requirements of each type of devel-
opment action by diversifying  the range
of instruments available. So there are
more tools in the box.
The importance attached to regional
integration,  a constant  feature of the
Community's  development policy, led
to 70"h of funds available under the
4th EDF being earmarked for this
purpose and the figure went up by 83%
under Lom6II. So in practice, 'pro-
gramme'funds (i.e. those earmarked
for project financing)  are divided up at
the beginning of each Convention  into
country allocations  for national projects
(this leads to programming  in each
country and a national indicative pro-
gramme) and an allocation for regional
programmes  (itself divided between
the various major regions). Part of the
funds, however, are set aside for oper-
ations concerning all ACP countries
(see inset).
At the other end of the scale are micro-
projects, small schemes in which the
local population  is directly involved.
The Convention encourages these by
means of particularly flexible financing
arrangements,  and 1 400 micro-pro-
L. Geographical
West Africa
Central Africa
Eastern Africa
Southern Africa
Indian Ocean
Caribbean
Pacific
ACP (region)
2. Sectoral
Transport & communications
Industry, energy & mining
Agriculture  & rural development
Training & public health
Technical assistance
Miscellaneous
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Regonal cooperation
Lomd I allocated 346 million ECU to regional cooperation, and Lomd
II 632 million ECU. By early 1984,97%  of the Lom6 I amount had
been committed  (and 67% disbursed),  while 5L% of the Lomd II
allocation was committed  (and 26% disbursed).
LomE II
25
10
22
11
3
9
4
I6
Lomi II
38
t4
20
T2
4
t2
(in "/")
jects were financed under Lom6 L Co-
financing with non-governmental  orga-
nizations outside the framework of the
Convention offers a further opportunity
to involve the people directly concerned
by development. All the experts  agree
that more needs to be done here if
genuinely self-reliant development
is to take root.
The diversity of projects and their
different  prospects in terms of economic
return were to lead to a diversification
of the methods and types of financing
and the conditions for applying them.
The lst EDF only made grants and
financed virtually nothing but infra-
structure. Lom6, after Yaound6, con-
tinued to diversifv: in addition  to
grants, we now have special loans, EIB
loans (ordinary or with interest sub-
sidies) and risk capital and quasi-capital
operations. There are special provisions
to encourage  schemes to help small and
medium-sized businesses. Lastly, Lom6
II introduced  new provisions to facili-
tate co-financing - a type of funding
already  used increasingly under the first
Convention,  and one which revealed
the catalyst effect of the European
Development  Fund.
Although the bulk of EDF aid goes on
development projects, part of the Fund
is reserved for emergency  situations
calling for immediate  assistance that
cannot be likened to investment. Lomd
I earmarked 150 million ECU and
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Lom6 II 200 million ECU for emer-
gency operations (supplemented by
emergency food aid financed bY the
Community budget), and more than
180 million ECU was actually used for
this purpose between 1976 and 1982,
43% of it for refugees and displaced
persons.
The Lom6 budget
Changes in the allocation of resources
from Lom6I to Lomd II reflect the
trends that have just been outlined.
The grant share has grown less rapidly
than that of other financing (loans and
risk capital) and the amount earmarked
for regional cooperation  has increased
proportionately more than the funds
allocated to national programmes.
Overall,I-om6 funds come to more than
5 500 million ECU, giving an average
of 1 100 million ECU for each Year of
operation. This is by far the most impor-
tant area of Community  aid. For the
ACP countries, Community aid proper
is relatively modest as compared to
total aid from the Member  States of the
EEC - 8% on average - but this figure
can be twice as hieh in the case of certain
countries.
The amounts earmarked for each
country are worked out according to a
number of socio-economic criteria, rvith
a minimum threshold for the smallest
countries. The biggest programmes are
for Ethiopia (125 million ECU) anct
Tanzania ( 1 15 million EICU).
At the other end of the scale, the small
islands are allocated amounts ranging
between  1 and 3.2 million ECU. This
apportionment  favours the smallest and
above all the poorest countries: the 36
least developed nations (they represent
44% of total ACP population) get
about 65% of Lom6 II programme  raid. I
Financial resources
Lom6116
Total EDF
Grants
Special loansr
Risk capital
Stabex 
2
d? sysmm 
*
Total EIB
Loans with interest subsidiesa
Loans outside the Convention
(mining & schemes of mutual
interest)
Total 
s 100.0
1 Special loans have standard  conditions for repayment - 40 years with a 10-year grace period- The 17o interest rate is brought  down to
0.75% for the least developed countries.
2 Stabex transfers  are gralts for the least developed countries and interest-free  loans for the others
3 Same conditions as for special loans.
a Interest subsidies are becoming standard and automatic and mean a 3olo cut in the interest rate for the borrower (except in the case of
investments  in the oil sector).
5 This figure ilcludes the running costs of the Commission delegatiom  in the ACP countries  ; under Lom6 II, they are paid directly ftom
the Community  budget.
6 Total EDF increase d ftom 4 62'l to 4 645 million ECU following  the accessiotr  of Zmbabwe,  St Vinc€nt  and the Grenadines, Vanuatu,
Belize and Antigua and Barbuda.
Solrce.' C-ommission.
million ECU million ECU
4 627
2 986
518
284
557
282
86.2
59.5
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2.8
11.0
2 980.3
2 057.7
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97.0
380.0
L1,.3
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390.0
390.0
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C-ontroversy and outlook
The innovatory  nature of the Lom6
policy and the hopes it has engendered
may explain the bitter criticism which
it sometimes  attracts. It is usually
blamed for not going far enough  and
for not having enough resources. The
policy may be exemplary, but it needs
amplifying,  it is said. This shows that
Lom6 is working along the right lines.
That is not to say that ACP-EEC rela-
tions are always idyllic - the permanent
dialogue carried on by the institutions
of the Convention  is frequently  en-
liveqed bv controversy. As no one
bothers to talk about things that are
going well, the discussions always hinge
on things that people think are going
not so well and it is of course these diffi-
culties and disagreements  that get into
the press.
The result is a series of standard  criti-
cisms, some of which are trotted out
regularly without any real thought  as
to whether they are well-founded  or
not.
Is the Communitv
protectionist?
Curiously enough, it is trade that arouses
most controversy. The statistics show
that the ACP share of the Community
market is dwindling, and their exports
are not very diversified,  raw materials
still'accounting  for the bulk of them.
Some observers have concluded that
trade cooperation is a'mug's game'and
that the Community's  apparent liber-
alism is only a front for protectionism.
The fact that the ACP countries have
lost ground  to the benefit of other Third
World producers who do not have such
favourable market access suffices to
show that this criticism is illoeical.
Would the Community practice secret
protectionism  towards the ACP Group
so as to give other third countries an
advantage?
And it is difficult to see how trade
arrangements  can be blamed for the
non-diversification of exports. Exports
of manufactures  have indeed  expanded,
as they have free access to the Com-
munity market, but progress is slow in
comparison with the performance of
some Asian countries which do not
have the same advantages.
Lastly, it should be added that the
safeguard clause in the Convention
has never been used.
Even if the Community sometimes  has
restrictive  reactions when its partners
apply for preferential arrangements  for
new export products (strawberries, for
example), these minor offences  are not
enough to get it convicted of protec-
tionism or to explain the failure of ACP
sales to improve.  The main problems
are the bottlenecks in the agricultural
and industrial production system, i.e. in
the development process itself and,
therefore, partially in the aid channelled
into it. For the ACP countries, trade
and aid must be combined.
The sugar protocol argument
For many ACP countries, the sugar pro-
tocol is vital. Without the guarantees it
offers, some economies would simply
have gone bankrupt. However,  this has
not prevented its application  being a
constant source of controversy and ill
humour.
Legally speaking,  the protocol, like
many texts that have been difficult to
negotiate, contains  an apparently insur-
mountable contradiction. It both
ensures quasi-indexation  on the prices
paid to European producers (which
constitute  a ceiling)  and provides for
annual negotiation  by the ACP group
and the Community.  But once the Com-
munity prices have been fixed within
the framework of the common agri-
cultural policy, there is nothing much
left to negotiate, so the system is an
inevitable  source of frustration.
Economically  speaking,  the problem
is probably  worse, The Community,
anxious to put a brake on over-pro-
duction  at home (it is accused of
depressing the world market with its
surpluses),  tends to restrict or even
block domestic price increases - which
directly affects the prices paid to ACP
producers. But as technological im-
provements in Europe bring down cost
prices, something which tends not to
happen with ACP cane sugar, the Com-
munity guarantee, however favourable
it may be - and it could scarcely be
better - is probably  not going to be
'enough to ensure the profitability of
production  in the long term. Here again,
going beyond the trade arrangements,
the real problem  is the production
system and its competitiveness.
Food crops or cash crops?
The Stabex system, better known than
the sugar protocol, is an even more
frequent target for what is often contra-
dictory criticism.  The same critics will
have no hesitation in deploring the
inadequacy of Stabex funds or calling
for the system to be extended  to other
products, while in the same breath
accusing it of increasing  the ACP
economies' dependence  on distant
markets by encouraging cash crops to
the detriment of food crops.
t2Criticism is also levelled at the Commis-
sion's proposals for stricter application
of Stabex transfers  to the rehabilitation
or diversification  of the production
system.  This would be a new form of
conditionality.  But at the same time, the
system  is criticized for its inefficiency
and its inability to cover losses which the
ACP countries have actually incurred,
when in fact these are due (among other
things) to a decline in the competi-
tiveness of their products.
The fact is that the originality of Stabex
means that it is often judged  by inappro-
priate criteria. It is not a world-wide
instrument and it cannot therefore solve
the international  problem of commod-
ity price fluctuation. So it is, by defini-
tion, inadequate  in this respect. But it is
one of the instruments that contribute
to the development of the ACP coun-
tries and it is intended to guarantee  a
certain degree of stability in their export
earnings and preserve  a part, but only a
part, of their economic  potential. Other
instruments exist to develop other areas
- rural development in general  and
food crops in particular have benefited
considerably  from EDF aid. The food
strategy support policy has revealed
the need to go further in this direction.
Spend fast, or spend well
Paradoxically, financial cooperation,
that major instrument of development
policy, has been the subject of much
less discussion and argument. No doubt
trade is a better topic for collective
discussions  than the implementation  of
development projects proper, which in
practice is discussed  individually be-
tween the Community  and each ACP
country.
However, there are one or two com-
plaints that crop up periodically: the
money  is not spent fast enough, pro-
jects progress slowly, Community
procedures are cumbersome.  This
concern  with the speed at which funds
are spent is quite legitimate,  but the
figures show that responsibility  for this
is, to say the least, shared: the speed of
disbursement varies from one recipient
country to another, although the proce-
dure, of course, is the same. Taking
the 4th EDF (Lomd I), almost 96%
had been committed  and an average of
81.% actually spent by early 1984. But
this 817o was in fact more than90"/"
in 12 countries and less than 50% in
five others. After three years of appli-
cation of the 5th EDF (Lomd II), 53"/"
of the funds had been committed  and
4I% actually spent on average, but
again, disbursement was in excess of
50% in21. countries and under 20"/'
in nine others.
This is not to say that the EEC's ad-
ministrative procedures could not be
speeded up, but that there are other
things causing  the delays in the recipient
countries.  Account must be taken of the
time needed to establish priorities,
choose projects, work them out in detail
and cope with the problems of imple-
mentation.  Different  types of project
take more or less time to finish. A con-
struction project can be completed
fairly quickly but agricultural  projects,
which are intended in future to have
priority, will inevitably take longer to
implement.  So speed of payment is not
an acceptable criterion when it comes
to assessing the quality of aid.
Outlook for the new Convention
Negotiations  are underway and it is
difficult to predict how they will turn
out. However. there is no doubt that
there will be a new Convention  to take
THELoMEPoLICY m
over from Lomd II, and it could include
Angola and Mozambique. There is no
doubt either that the present Conven-
tion will be substantially maintained
and the fundamental lines of the Lomd
policy confirmed.
Will there be anything new? That is for
the negotiators to decide. However,
certain ideas that have been advanced
(by the European  Commission  in parti-
cular) will make their appearance either
in the text of the new Convention or in
the way it is applied -which is every bit
as important.
No one will deny the need to give
priority to rural development, parti-
cularly the food production  side. Nego-
tiators will agree that there is every
point in covering new areas of cooper-
ation -fisheries or cultural cooperation,
say - and discussions on the promotion
of private investment, a subject touched
on during the negotiations for Lomd II,
will be taken further.
The Commission has strongly empha-
sized the need to improve the practice
of cooperation itself, to ensure that
Community aid and ACP efforts fit in
better with one another and are there-
fore more effective. This is a delicate
subject, involving a critical review of
the past and self-examination  on both
sides - a difficult exercise in collective
negotiations. But is there any doubt that
this demand will be taken into account
in the end? It will mean that the Lom6
policy will be more than just a model
of cooperation and will become a model
instrument  of development.  ffi
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AThe Mcditerranean policy
trtroduction
The Community originallY defined
its relations with the ACP countries
and with the southern Mediter-
ranean countries at the same time.
The negotiations which led uP to
Lom6 I and to the Mediterranean
agreements started tog'ether. At a
time when the CommunitY is trYing
to give its cooperation PolicY a
spring clean, it has to put its overall
plan into practice, first fo, the ACP
countries, as there must be some-
thing to take over from the Present
Convention, and then for its Part-
ners south of the Mediterranean,
now that the third enlargement of
the Community is nearlY with us. So
the outlines of what could be the
Twelve's Mediterranean PolicY are
already taking shape. IIntensive trade
(in %: trade with EEC ltrade with the world)
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countries
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over 20%
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A 'crossroads' policy
The Mediterranean  is a crossroads.
Similarly, the Community's  policy in
this region is the meeting  point of
several separate actions which have in
common  the same ultimate objective -
ensuring peace and prosperity  for the
peoples who live there, in a relationship
which is necessarily  one of interdepen-
dence.
The Mediterranean,  a particularly suit-
able place for the dialogue between
Europe and the South,  is symbolic and,
as such. well to the fore in the Commu-
nity's development cooperation policy.
But the Community  itself is undergoing
changes in this region, expanding to
bring in first Greece and soon Spain and
Portugal too. We all know that enlarge-
ment to the south will require  a new
balance of Community  policies and
greater internal solidarity - in short a
North-South policy within the Commu-
nity itself.
Welcoming  Spain and Portugal without
ruining cooperation with the countries
on the southern shores of the Medi-
terranean is no mean challenge for the
Community,  particularly since there
are other partners in between - Yugo-
slavia, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta -
which cannot be overlooked.
The whole of the Arab world beyond
the Mediterranean  shores is concerned.
The cooperation  agreements with the
Maghreb and Mashreq countries
involve seven nations in the Arab
League; four others - Mauritania,
Sudan, Somalia  and Djibouti - belong
to the Lomd Convention;  and an agree-
ment with North Yemen is beine
negotiated.
The Euro-Arab Dialogue has attempted
to round off these individual agree-
ments with collective cooperation  (see
inset). Its ups and downs and stops and
starts show both how difficult and
inevitable  a process it is. They also show
to what extent political and economic
problems are interwoven,  inseparable
even, in the Mediterranean  - hence the
difficulty for a Community  which is
still more economic than political.
Rather than as an illustration of this
political weakness the Community's
determination to maintain cooperation
relations with all Mediterranean  coun-
tries regardless of tensions and conflicts
should be seen as a major political act
and not as an inability to make a proper
choice. I
The Euro-Arab Dialogue
Origins
On the occasion of the Copen-
hagen Summit in December
1973, shortly after the first 'oil
shock', all the Arab countries
told the Nine that they wanted
the Community  to develop its
relations with the Arab world
and embark upon long term co-
operation with it in all fields.
Different stages
In June I97 5, the first meeting of
the Euro-Arab Dialogue was
held in Cairo. The aims and rules
of the dialogue  were laid down in
a joint memorandum and a series
of working groups were set uP.
The first meeting of the General
Committee (the organizing body
of the dialogue) was held in
Luxembourg in May I97 6 and
there were three other meetings
- in Tunis (1977), Brussels
(1977) and Damascus (1978) -
before the dialogue was suspen-
ded at the request of the Arab
League (March 1979) following
the signing of the Camp David
agreements.
A 'political' meeting  was held in
Luxembourg in November 1980
to lay down guidelines and ar-
rangements for continuation of
the dialogue and, in December
1983, the General Committee
met again in Athens. But they
were unable to reach agreement
on the political aspects of the
problem and this prevented pro-
gress in other areas of cooper-
ation.
A fundamental misunder-
standing
Because the European Commu-
nity is primarily  an economic
body, it cannot deal with political
questions - such as those of the
Middle East - unless it does so
outside its usual structures, i.e.
within the framework of political
cooperation. The Arab League,
which is primarily  a political
organization, saw the dialogue
principally as an opportunity to
influence European views on the
Middle East.
Areas of cooperation
Apart from these political
questions, the dialogue did make
it possible to deal with a number
of topics - the transfer of tech-
nology, investment protection,
trade promotion, agricultural
development, studies of industri-
altzatron, scie ntific cooperatio n
and cultural exchange. Both
parties allocated financial
resources.THE MEDITERRANEAN  POLICY 
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Strong interdependence
The Community, overall,  is the leading
trading partner of the countries south
of the Mediterranean.  It is by far the
biggest outlet for exports from the
Maghreb and for Egypt, Syria and Israel
too. Only Jordan and Lebanon have
Arab countries as their principal  clients.
This dependence  on the European
market does, however, vary in nature
and degree. Most exports from Algeria
(98%), Syria (94%) and Egypt are
petroleum  products and, although the
European market is not negligible as far
as other products (Algerian wine and
Egyptian  cotton) are concerned, it is
not absolutely vital for their economic
and social stabilitv.
The same is not true of Israel, however,
where fruit and vegetables make up
40% of sales to Europe - which takes
for example, more than 60"/" of its total
exports of citrus fruit. The same goes
for Morocco.  More than a quarter of its
exports are agricultural  products for
which the Community is the main
market. In Tunisia, agriculture's  share
of the export market has declined
noticeably over the past few years, but
olive oil, which provides a living for
200 000 farmers, is still of major econ-
omic and social importance - and
Europe takes slightly more than half
Tunisian olive oil exports.
In addition to the earnings from exports
to Europe, remittances from migrant
workers are important to these coun-
tries. More than a million North Afri-
cans work in iiurope, making up about
a quarter of all migrant workers from
outside the Community. The money
they send home is equal to 20"/o of the
export trade in Tunisia and more than
50% in Morocco.  The same thing
happens in other Mediterranean  coun-
tries, Yugoslavia and Turkey, for
example. Migration and the human and
social problems that go with it are a
characteristic aspect of Mediterranean
interdependence:  these few figures do
not do justice to it, but they do show
that the migrant workers have not only
contributed to our own prosperity,  but
are making what is sometimes  a massive
contribution to the foreign exchange
reserves, and therefore  the purchasing
power, of their countries of origin. And
Europe  gets the benefit of much of this
purchasing power.
The southern Mediterranean
outlet
The Community  is the major supplier
of all these countries and purchases
from the EEC represent 60% of total
imports in Algeria, 50o/" in Tunisia and
44% in Morocco.  In the Mashreq
countries and in Israel, the figure varies
between 30% and 35"/o.
The southern Mediterranean  is a sub-
stantial market for the Community-
It represents  7.3 "h of our total exports,
i.e. as much as we sell to all the ACP
countries combined, more than three
times what we sell to Japan and half
what we sell to the USA. Europe is
having to struggle  to maintain or im-
prove its position on the American  andnx  THE ME,DITERRANEAN  POLICY
Japanese  markets;it  has won the
southern Mediterranean  market, with
its enormous  demand - it would be
inconceivable for Europe to let a
market like that collapse on its door-
step.
This rapid list of the economic aspects
of interdependence would not be com-
plete without  the aid which the southern
Mediterranean  countries get from the
Community  and its Member  States.
Aid provided  under the cooperation
agreements with the Community is
minimal. Some countries get important
amounts  of food aid with it. Egypt is,
with India, the main beneficiary  of this,
having received the equivalent of 200
million ECU in food aid between 1979
and 1983 (compared to 170 million
ECU in financial aid allocated  under the
first financial protocol signed between
the Community and Egypt).
On the other hand, total European aid
(Community plus Member  States) is
significant everywhere. In 1981, it
represent ed 45"1, of all official aid
channelled to the countries of the
Maghreb and the Mashreq and only in
Egypt and Israel did it fail to outstrip
American aid. However,  OPEC is the
biggest donor in Jordan, Lebanon and
Syria. t
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One agee-ment,
eight variations
The cooperation agreements signed one
after the other with the countries of the
Maghreb (1976) and the Mashreq
(1977) were based on the same model,
which reflects the Community's  concern
for coherence in its search for an overall
Mediterranean  approach. The agree-
ment with Israel, although also based on
the same model, is somewhat  different,
in view of the level of development  the
country has reached.
Like the Lomd Convention,  these
agreements  establish cooperation  be-
tween the Community  and its partners,
i.e. they cover both trade arrangements
and economic, financial  and technical
cooperation of a lasting nature (the
agreements  are of unlimited duration).
Only the protocols fixing the amount of
financial  aid are for a limited period
(five years). Institutional provisions
allow for dialogue between  the parties -
there is a Cooperation  Committee  at
ambassadorial  level and a Cooperation
Council at ministerial level - offering
the possibility  of joint evaluation of
results  and joint definition of new
policies.
On the two main aspects of cooperation,
trade and developmeni  aid, the agree-
ments have more similarities  than dif-
ferences.
The trade arrangements,  in all countries
but Israel, are based on non-reciprocity,
in spite of the fact that liberalization
of trade is still the long-term aim. The
Community merely gets the benefit of
the most-favoured-nation  clause, as it
does under Lomd, although exceptions
may be made for other developing
countries or as part of regional inte-
gration policies. European exports do
not get special treatment on the markets
of the Maghreb or the Mashreq,
whereas these countries'  exports enter
the Community  market on favourable
terms. The general principle for prod-
ucts not covered  by the common agri-
cultural policy - essentially  raw
materials and industrial  products - is
free access (no customs duties or
quotas). It was not possible to make
such generous concessions  for agricul-
tural products, but variable (20%-
100%) tariff reductions are provided
for most (80%-90%) agricultural
exports. In spite of its limitations, the
whole system was explicitly intended
to develop trade and, in view of its per-
manency  and the security thus pro-
vided, to help industrialization in the
partner countries.
Different amounts of money
Israel is a special case. Because of the
level of the country's development, the
I975 agreement  aimed at the gradual
creation of a free-trade zone, in the
industrial sector at least. So Commu-
nity concessions were matched  byI  THEMEDITERRANEAN POLICY
Israeli concessions  for Community
exports - gradual dismantling of tariffs
and removal of quantitative restrictions
for industrial products and limited tariff
reductions for some agricultural  prod-
ucts. For the same reasons, EEC-
Israel cooperation was designed pri-
marily  as trade cooperation  and the
economic,  financial and technical co-
operation schemes (additional protocol
and financial protocol) were only
defined at a later stage, in 1977 (the
basic agreement  dates from 1975).
The field of application  is certainly  as
broad as in the case of the Maghreb and
the Mashreq countries, but the
resources available under the financial
protocol  are slender  and only involve
EIB loans on standard market terms.
Apart from the agricultural concession,
worked out with the export interests of
each of the partners in mind, the main
thing that distinguishes the different
agreements  (or rather the financial
protocols  attached  to them) is the
amount of money available.
The first protocols covered the period
November 1978 to October 1981. The
second generation runs from 1982 to
1986 (see tables), with a total increase
in funds of 52"/" at current  prices, the
price index having gone up by about
43%. But as the breakdown  into Ioans
and grants is overall less favourable,  it
has to be admitted  that Community  aid
has not increased  in real terms. How-
ever, the breakdown of total funds be-
tween recipient  countries is to the ad-
vantage of the least developed  countries
(Egypt and Morocco) and of Lebanon.
The agreements with the Maghreb have
one distinguishing  feature, however -
unlike the Lom6 Convention  and the
other cooperation  agreements,  they
contain provisions on labour. This social
section - less detailed than the North
African negotiators would have liked,
but which they consider  to be extremely
important nonetheless - provides, in
particular, for non-discrimination as
regards wages and working conditions
and various social security measures. I
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deficit of their balance of trade with the
Community.  They offer three main
explanations for this state of affairs:
'Firstly, by extending the initial con-
cessions to all Mediterranean  countries,
and by granting concessions to other
developing countries, the Community
has eroded their preferences.
Secondly,  although it has not been
proved that they are the cause of the
Community's  own problems, the Com-
munity has adopted a protectionist
attitude towards them in the industrial
sector (textiles),  without paying proper
attention to the complementary  nature
of its own and its preferential  partners'
interests.
Thirdly, the common agricultural  policy
has become  an increasingly protec-
tionist operation,  resulting in pro-
duction  increases and surpluses regard-
less of the real market situation  and
the interests of traditional preferential
suppliers.'1
Large trade deficit
Although the results do not live up to
the hopes the various parties had placed
in the cooperation agreements and even
if, undeniably,  certain difficult prob-
lems have arisen, the European view
of the way trade has developed  is less
negative. Overall, the Mediteranean
partners'trade deficit with the Commu-
nity is no doubt still large, but, in most
cases, its relative size has decreased and
the extent to which imports cover
exports has considerably improved. In
Morocco,  for example, the ratio of
imports to exports rose from 6l%
(1976-79) to 72% (1980-82), in
Tunisia from 50% (1975) to 60"/'
(1982) and in Egypt from 23% (I975)
' Commission report to the Council on the
exploratory talks with the Mediterranean
countries and the applicant countries
(May 1984).
The policyin practice
The agreements  have given rise to diffi-
culties and disappointments on the
trade side in particular,  but cooperation
has progressed in a generally satis-
factory manner. The main complaint
from the Community's  partners is that
the funds available are very limited.
How have they been used? First, the
speed of implementation in the differ-
ent countries:  at the end of 1982, only
60% of the funds available in Algeria
and Syria had been committed  for the
period 1.978-81,  although the figure was
almost I00% elsewhere.  In the main,
aid under the first protocols was allo-
cated to infrastructure (roads, bridges,
railways, urban development  and
hydraulics)  and to industry (power
stations and small and medium-sized
businesses) - although training and
research schemes were substantial in
many cases too. In Jordan, 7 5% of EEC
grant money  was spent on this sector
and Algeria earmarked a fair per-
centage of Community funds for the
training of management  staff, partic-
ularly in the agricultural  sector. The
second protocol has only been partially
implemented.  The programmes put
forward by the Community's  partners
reveal a desire to concentrate on fewer
areas. Although not always the case, the
general result is that the agricultural
sector has been given more emphasis.
This applies in Morocco,  Egypt and,
above all, Tunisia, where all Commu-
nity aid will go to support the drive for
greater self-sufficiency  in food.
In the case of Israel, in addition  to EIB
loans, one or two cooperation  schemes
of limited scope have been organized
with money from the Community
budget.
In the trade sector, however, the Com-
munity's partners all see the results as
disappointing.  In their eyes, the Medi-
terranean policy has not lived up to
expectations. The proof of this, they
feel, is the continuing  or worsening- 
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Some Community-financed proj ects
The Ai't-Chouarit  dam (Morocco).  This will provide
water for the town of Marrakesh and the Haouz
region. It will also supply energy to a hydroelectric
power station. The total cost is}4}million  ECU and
the Community  is providing a third (87 million
ECU, 52 million from the EIB and 37 million from
the Commission  budget).
The Helwan project (Egypt). This will provide  a
sewage network to drain an important industrial
area to the south of Cairo. The water thus collected
will be used to irrigate some 15 000 ha of arable land
in an adjoining region. The project is being co-
financed by Europe and Egypt and the total cost is
183 million ECU. The Commission is providing
16.5 million of this from its own budget, Italy is
contributing 5 million ECU and the Netherlands
10 million ECU.
Training centres (Tunisia). The Commission and
Tunisia are co-financing three training centres which
will be specializing  in the upkeep of communal
buildings (e.g. hospitals), mechanical  construction,
and masonry, woodwork and electrical engineering
for the building trade. The Commission  budget is
supplying  half the total financing (3.9 million ECU)'
The Centre for Scientific  Study and Research,
Damascus (Syria). The Commission has provided
scientific equipment for remote sensing, solar
energy, optics (laser)', minicomputerization  and
lubrication. Total aid of 5.4 million ECU also
includes the technical assistance required to run the
equipment in and to train Syrian scientific staff.
The Industrial Development Bank (Jordan). This
bank has obtained a 6.3 million ECU loan (6 million
from the EIB's own resources and 0.3 million in the
form of special loans) - an example of Community
support for small and medium-sized businesses via
loans to development banks for onlending.
to 7 0"/" ( I 98 1- 82). The figure for Israel
was 85% in 1980, but it dropped after-
wards, mainly because  of domestic
economic  policy (see table).
The Community,  it is true, asked some
of its partners to subscribe to voluntary
restraint agreements in the textile sector
in 1978, although there was no provi-
sion for this in the cooperation agree-
ments. However, these measures were
more favourable than those which the
Community  negotiated with its non-
preferential  partners. The statistics
show that they have not halted the
development of exports,  even if the rate
at which these have increased has
slowed. Between  1978 and 1981, for
example, Morocco's textile exports
increased 25% in volume and 52"/" in
value, while Spain's textile exports
increased in volume by only 5.6o/", and
Portugal'sby  14"/", over the same
period.
As regards agricultural  products - of
particular  importance to Morocco,
Tunisia and Israel - the difficulties
which the Community  has encountered
with its own Mediterranean  produce
may have prevented the vigorous ex-
pansion of trade which its partners  /
wanted from the agreements, but they
have not resulted in a general decline
in exports. On the contrary,  these have
increased. I
A few facts
Food dependency
Two countries - Algeria and Egypt - are heavily dependent  on out-
side sources when it comes to meeting their food requirements. The
figure is 70"h for Algeria and 50% overall for Egypt (although it is as
high as75"h for cereals, as against 25% in 1960).
Agricultural trade
All the southern Mediterranean  countries are running a deficit on their
overall agricultural trade balance and (except Israel) on their trade
balance with the Community  too. European farmers sell more agri-
cultural products to these countries than their farmers sell to Europe.
In 1980, the Community  recorded a surplus of something  like 1 500
million ECU in its trade with the Maghreb and Mashreq countries. It
is worth comparing this figure with the amount of official aid which
these countries get from the Community and the Member States -
about USD 800 million.
Morocco is one of the countries in the group with a slight surplus in its
agricultural trade with the Community.  However, while Morocco's
exports to Europe increased by 13% between I97 6 and 1982, Euro-
pean sales to Morocco increased by around 200%.
Dependence on overseas markets
This is one of the features of the economies of the southern  Mediter-
ranean countries, as indeed of most developing countries. Regional
trade is still small: trade with other Arab countries only represents
1.8% of Algeria's exports,2.8"h  of Morocco's exports and 5.4"/" of
Tunisia's exports.
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The challenge of enlargement
With the prospect of Spain and Portugal
joining the Community,  the southern
Mediterranean countries' disappoint-
ment turned to plain anxiety.
Paradoxically, as the Community
becomes  more Mediterranean,  it is
likely to have even more problems
sticking to its idea of a policy covering
the whole of the region to the greater
good of everyone concerned.
Not that the political project is open to
question. The applicant countries are
completely behind it. Portugal has
emphasized 'the obvious  interest of
keeping and extending a coherent
Mediterranean policy for the enlarged
Community',  and Spain has pointed out
that 'political stability in this area is a
central feature of Spanish foreign
policy . . . and that such stability is
closely linked to economic  stability . . .'
It is the affinities between  the Medi-
terranean  countries that justify the
political project and at the same time
complicate  the process of putting it into
practice in economic terms. The trouble
is that they all produce the same crops.
Agriculturally, they do not complement
each other, they compete with each
other. Worse, production  often out-
strips consumption, not just in the Com-
munity but in the Mediterranean region
itself. The enlarged  Community will be
self-sufficient in many areas. Its cover-
age of its own needs will rise from 96%
to 106"h in the case of olive oil, from
49% to 86% in the case of citrus fruit
and it will be up near the 100% mark in
the case of many fresh vegetables.
There will be bigger wine surpluses too.
So what future is there for the tradi-
tional exports of the southern Medi-
terranean countries?
Their foremost concern  is with agri-
cultural products. This is a field where
there is obvious competition and they
are going to be on the wrong side of the
fence, Because, for some countries
(Israel, Morocco  and Tunisia),, pro-
duction and export of these products
are vital. And because, in agriculture,
changes  are long and difficult and it is
not always possible to diversify. This is
a problem both sides of the Mediter-
ranean, but it is not the only one the
Community's  partners have in mind.
They are unanimous in emphasizing
that the accession  of Portugal and Spain
will accentuate  most of the factors
behind the crisis in their relations with
the Community - an increase in sensi-
tive sectors (textiles, for example), free
movement of Portuguese  and Spanish
workers, dwindling resources for finan-
cial cooperation  . . . and a tendency for
investors to shift their investments to
the applicant countries, etc.r
The accession  negotiations began in
I978-79 and have been progressing
slowly since. As soon as they opened,
the southern Mediterranean  countries
insisted on the Community  running
parallel negotiations with them and
after several cooperation  councils  had
discussed the matter, exploratory talks
were held in 1983 and 19t84.
New policy guidelines
The European  Commission took
account of the criticism  and suggestions
formulated on this occasirln when it laid
down the guidelines for tlhe Mediter-
ranean policy of the enlarged Com-
munity.
They can be summarized as follows:
(i) The definition of a nerv Mediter-
ranean policy should certainly  take
account of the consequen,ces of enlarge-
ment, but it should also krok at the
relative shortcomings in the implemen-
tation of the cooperation  agreements.
(ii) The trade provisions of the agree-
ments are fundamental  to relations be-
tween the Community and the third
countries of the Mediterranean and the
new policy should pay particular atten-
tion to improving the way'they work.
(iii) As a result, the Comrnunity  should
confirm the opening of itsr market for
industrial products - which means
dropping  certain restrictive measures
in the long run. However,  the main need
is for more industrial consultation  to
prevent further disruptive  situations
from arising.
(iv) The need, which the llommission
recognizes,  to maintain thre patterns of
trade in products which  arre of major
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economic  importance to the partner
countries means that solutions have to
be found for agricultural  products if
trade is not to fall below its present
level. Specific proposals  have been
made with this in mind, particularly for
fruit and vegetables, olive oil and wine.
Opening up the Community  market to
a greater extent, while essential in the
immediate future, does not rule out
efforts to achieve product diversifi-
cation.
(v) Diversification should also be one of
the aims of greater agricultural  coop-
eration, in accordance with the wishes
of the partner countries, who all want
Community  support for their food
strategies.
(vi) Other areas of cooperation should
be encouraged too: actions to boost
regional integration  and develop trade
between  countries in the Mediter-
ranean, scientific and technical coop-
eration to develop local capacity, and
the development of small and medium-
sized businesses.
(vii) The social sector has not been for-
gotten. On migrant workers, the Com-
mission comes out firmly against any
policy of compulsory and systematic
return. But there should also be support
for vocational training, both for migrant
workers in the Community  and for
those who choose  to return to their
home countries (aid to voluntary re-
patriation).
(viii) Although commercial coopera-
tion and the development of trade are
both considered as preconditions  for a
dynamic relationship,  the financial  aid
to be allocated  by the Community  is still
important. It should be increased
because 'the extent to which the Com-
munity contributes  to its partners'
economic and social development  and
develops  a strategy of complemen-
tarity with them'r will be the decisive
test of its desire to implement  an overall
Mediterranean  policy. 'The combi-
nation of trade and cooperation will be
the cornerstone of this policy."
These are only guidelines. None of the
Member  States of the Community
questions  the principles behind them
and they allrealize what is at stake. The
Commission's appeal is quite unam-
biguous: 'The next enlargement will
increase both the Community's  sensi-
tivity and its responsibilities  towards
this region. It should prompt greater
awareness of this and stimulate the
political will to deal not only with the
immediate  consequences, important
and difficult as they are, but also with
the longer-term problem of the funda-
mental interests of the Mediterranean
countries as a whole, which make the
short-term  cost and sacrifices seem very
modest - as in fact thev are.'r t
I Commission report to the Council on the
exploratory  talks with the Mediterranean
countries and the applicant countries
(May 1984).
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